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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO APPELLATE STRUCTURE AND
THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Jonathan R. Nash†
Rafael I. Pardo‡
Commentators have theorized that several factors may improve the process, and thus
perhaps the accuracy, of appellate review: (1) review by a panel of judges, (2) subjectmatter expertise in the area of the appeal, (3) other lawfinding ability, (4) adherence to
traditional notions of appellate hierarchy, and (5) the judicial independence of appellate
judges. The considerable discussion that has expounded upon these theories has occurred
in a vacuum of abstract generalization. This Article adds a new dimension by presenting
the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy appellate opinions issued over a threeyear period. The federal bankruptcy appellate structure provides certain litigants the
choice to appeal, in the first instance, to one of two distinct appellate tribunals—district
courts and bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs)—whose structural features relating to the
theorized qualities of appellate review differ. As BAPs appear to have more of the
features identified as improving the quality of appellate review, the study tests the theory
through various hypotheses that focus on the perception held by other federal courts
within the bankruptcy appellate structure of the quality of appellate review provided by
these distinct appellate tribunals. The data show that, as measured by (1) the subsequent
disposition rendered by courts of appeals and (2) the citation practices of other federal
courts to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district courts, BAPs have been
perceived to provide a better quality of appellate review. Having unearthed some
evidence that supports the theoretical notions underlying the quality of appellate review,
this Article concludes that commentators and policymakers ought to be encouraged to
explore further, in a more detailed manner, the question of how appellate structure can
be designed to produce better results.
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INTRODUCTION

What is the ideal structure for appellate review? Without providing a definitive
answer to the question, commentators have suggested several factors that may improve
the process, and thus perhaps the accuracy, of appellate review. First, it is said that panels
of judges are preferable to review by a single judge. Second, expertise in the relevant area
of law is a benefit. Third, other indicia of lawfinding ability—such as the ability of
lawyers and judges to focus on legal issues without the distraction of factual conflicts and
the amenability of judges’ schedules to contemplation and reflection—contribute to the
quality of appellate review. A fourth factor is whether the court adheres to traditional
notions of appellate hierarchy, for example following earlier precedents of that court.
Finally, it is said that the independence of the appellate judges—that is, the extent to
which job features such as life tenure and a guaranteed salary tend to insulate judges from
pressures to decide cases or issues one way or another—is of value.
In this Article, we endeavor to evaluate empirically the relative quality of
appellate review. To do this, we rely upon data obtained from the appellate review of
bankruptcy matters. The current federal bankruptcy appellate structure provides an
excellent setting in which to study appellate review since it offers litigants two paths for
obtaining appellate review. First, after the bankruptcy judge issues a ruling, litigants may
have the district court—in the person of a single district judge—review that ruling.
Alternatively, the parties may agree (in circuits that have them) to have the bankruptcy
judge’s ruling reviewed by a panel of bankruptcy judges—a so-called “bankruptcy
appellate panel” or “BAP.” Further appeal in both cases—whether from the district court
or the bankruptcy appellate panel—lies with the proper federal circuit court of appeals.
We collected data on affirmance rates in and citation rates to appellate bankruptcy
opinions. Analyses of the data generally—and analyses of the citation data in particular—
support the notion that BAP decisions in our study are perceived to be of greater quality
than are district court decisions. First, we find some support for the proposition that
courts of appeals are more likely to uphold upon review the conclusions of BAPs than
district courts. Second, BAP decisions are, with statistical significance, cited more
frequently than are district court decisions by bankruptcy courts, BAPs, federal courts of
appeals, and courts in other circuits. Only district courts are not more likely to cite BAP
decisions than decisions rendered by district courts.
Our findings will be of interest both to theoreticians and policymakers. If courts
try to reach “correct” decisions, then our findings generally buttress the various theories
about how to structure appellate tribunals so as to maximize the quality of appellate
review. This, in turn, should guide policymakers in designing appellate tribunals and
appellate structures in general. In particular, multimember tribunals that adhere to
traditional notions of appellate hierarchy and that have subject-matter expertise in the
area of the appeal appear to be desirable. And even if judges do not strive to resolve
issues and cases “correctly,” our findings still seem to support the notion that judges
perceive that appellate tribunals that have certain attributes will reach correct
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conclusions. In this sense, our findings show the persuasive strength of the theoreticians’
story, or at least judges’ perceptions of the strength of that story.
The Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides an overview of the
theoretical literature discussing the quality of appellate review. Part II discusses the
means by which we undertook to evaluate the quality of appellate review: Part II.A
presents the legal setting of appeals of core bankruptcy proceedings, and Part II.B sets out
the hypotheses we sought to test. Part III explains how we tested the hypotheses. Part
III.A details the data we compiled and the essential features of those data. The next two
Parts present the findings of our statistical analyses, with Part III.B explicating the
bivariate descriptive statistics and Part III.C presenting the results of regression tests we
conducted.
I.

EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Assembling an exhaustive list of the ideal elements of appellate review would
present no small task. However, the academic literature does suggest several attributes
that will tend to contribute to better appellate review.
First, commentators laud the use of panels of judges, rather than single judges, to
hear appeals. There are two justifications. First, to the extent that there is an objectively
“correct” answer to a question of law posed on appeal, and to the extent that there is a
greater than 50% chance that each appellate judge will reach that “correct” answer, the
Condorcet Jury Theorem instructs that a panel of judges will more likely reach the
“correct” answer than will a single appellate judge.1 Second, even to the extent that one
might question the validity of the assumptions underlying the applicability of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of appellate review,2 there is an argument that the
collegial nature of multimember appellate panels contributes to reflective decisionmaking
and thus to the quality of appellate review.3
A second factor that contributes positively to appellate review is expertise of the
appellate decisionmaking in the subject matter of the appeal.4 Thus, for example,
Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with an eye
1

See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations
of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 1022-23 (2004) (describing Condorcet Jury Theorem).
2
See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts,
56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 112-13 & nn.130-31 (2003) (questioning the applicability of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem in the context of appellate judicial decisionmaking).
3
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decisionmaking, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1639 (2003); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82,
100-02 (1986). But see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (finding empirical evidence that judges on an appellate panel of the same political
party are more likely to vote ideologically); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004)
(finding some evidence of ideological voting on federal courts of appeals).
4
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 115
(1997) (“Specialization offers two major advantages: expertise and uniformity.”). For an argument that it
might benefit the legal system to have some judges with expertise in areas other than law, see Adrian
Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices? (Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 134), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=943369.
4

to creating an appellate body with the expertise to deal effectively with the complex area
of patent law.5
Third, courts and commentators identify general “lawfinding ability”—as distinct
from expertise in particular areas of law—as a virtue for appellate review.6 While the
Supreme Court has characterized the presence of multijudge panels as “[p]erhaps most
important” in assessing lawfinding ability,7 it has also indicated other factors tend to
enhance lawfinding ability in the appellate setting. Specifically, lawfinding ability is
greater when (i) the judges have schedules that allow time for reflection;8 (ii) the judges
resolve legal issues once the factual record is fully developed;9 and (iii) the attorneys may
focus on the legal issues in question without the distraction of trial advocacy.10
A fourth factor that tends to be associated with the quality of appellate review is
the extent to which an appellate court conforms to traditional appellate hierarchy.11
Courts in the United States are organized according to a standard hierarchy: Trial courts
decide cases in the first instance, with a first appeal as of right to an intermediate
appellate court and a second appeal to a high court at the discretion of that court.12 Within
that hierarchy are rules of precedent that, while not absolute, create barriers against courts
overruling holdings of earlier cases. As a general matter, under so-called horizontal stare
decisis, high courts and intermediate appellate courts will follow their own earlier
precedents.13 Further, vertical stare decisis binds inferior courts generally to follow
governing precedents issued by superior courts within the hierarchy.14
5

See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petheridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114-17 (2004).
6
See Nash, Resuscitating Deference, supra note 1, at 1022.
7
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991).
8
Id. at 231 (noting, with a negative connotation from the perspective of lawfinding ability, that district
judges “preside alone over fast-paced trials”).
9
Id. at 232.
10
Id. at 231-32.
11
See, e.g., Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. 67, 68 (2006) (“The essence of the American system of precedent as experienced in practice
resides in the great authority and hierarchical arrangement of the courts.”); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between
Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2047 (2004)
(suggesting that appellate review and appellate hierarchy are integrally related by noting that “the various
characteristics and functions of appellate review . . . suggest that some gradation of judicial authority is
central to the nature of appellate review,” and that “[a]n appellate system of review is one defined by
hierarchy”); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 998 (2002) (“[T]he
development of an appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the higher levels and stringent rules of
vertical stare decisis operates structurally to ensure that no individual judge can, by his or her actions alone,
inflict too much damage on the judiciary by making aberrant or overly ambitious decisions.”). But cf.
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that the common
principal-agent model for analyzing lower court efforts to fulfill appellate court mandates ignores the
allocation of discretion to lower courts), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=936769.
12
See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1607-08 (1995) (elucidating the traditional
appellate hierarchy).
13
Absent en banc review, courts of appeals as bound by prior decisions issued by the court
(independent of panel composition). E.g., United States v. Myers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000).
5

It is true that court systems need not have the features of appellate hierarchy and
stare decisis to function, and indeed to function well.15 Indeed, commentators debate
whether Congress might statutorily alter or abrogate the traditional rules of stare decisis,
as well as the normative questions of whether it should.16 Nonetheless, whether it is
constitutionally mandated or normatively desirable, the assumption underlying the
dominant U.S. judicial structure is that horizontal and vertical stare decisis provide
precedential power to decisions by appellate courts. Assuming that judges seek to arrive
at correct outcomes,17 these standard rules of precedent presumably increase the quality

In general, horizontal stare decisis does not extend beyond the court that issued an opinion to sibling
courts of the same hierarchical level. While intermediate appellate courts will follow decisions issued by
earlier panels of the same court—notwithstanding that the composition of the judges on the panels may
vary—intermediate appellate courts generally are under no precedential obligation to follow decisions
issued by sibling intermediate appellate courts of similar hierarchical rank. Thus, for example, a Ninth
Circuit panel may find First Circuit precedent to be persuasive and choose to follow it, but stare decisis
does not demand that the Ninth Circuit so act; rather, stare decisis leaves the Ninth Circuit free to disagree
with and to disregard the First Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 824-25 (1994). Also the rule of horizontal
precedent does not extend to trial courts, as discussed below. See id. at 825 (“[A] district court judge may
ignore the decisions of ‘foreign’ courts of appeals as well as other district court judges, even within the
same district.” (footnote omitted)); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1609; Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis
and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003). But see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and
Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1095 (1994) (noting a “long
tradition” of district judges deviating from prior precedent in the same district only in extraordinary
circumstances); infra note 68 and accompanying text.
14
See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1609; Susan B. Haire, Stefanie Lindquist, & Donald R.
Songer, Appellate Court Structure in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 143, 145 (2003) (“Appellate oversight in the lower tires of the federal judicial hierarchy . . . provides
a process through which circuit judges are expected to promote legal rules that will guide decision making
in subsequent cases”); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 111 (“[C]ourts generally issue written decisions that,
when published, have precedential effect on future rulings involving different parties.”).
15
For example, civil law systems do not rely upon as stringent a hierarchy, or upon rules of precedent
as stringent. See, e.g., Thomas Lundmark, Book Review, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 211, 214-15 (1998) (“One of
the classic differences between civil-law and common-law jurisdictions is that the former do not recognize
judicial precedent as an independent source of law.”) (reviewing INTERPRETIVE PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997); Caminker, supra note 13,
at 826; Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1608. For an exposition, and critique, of the necessity and desirability
of stare decisis, see Caminker, supra note 13.
16
Compare, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001) (arguing in favor of the constitutional status of
stare decisis); Caminker, supra note 13, at 828-34 (arguing that the constitutional case for the binding
nature of Supreme Court precedent on lower federal courts is “quite powerful”), with Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000) (arguing to the contrary); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over
the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000) (same); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMM. 191 (2001) (same); Thomas
Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001) (same). See also
Barrett, supra note 13 (arguing that some applications of stare decisis may implicate due process concerns).
17
See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1606 (taking as a baseline assumption in developing economic
theory of stare decisis that “the ‘judicial team’ seeks to answer the expected number of ‘correct’ answers
subject to its resource constraint”); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739,
746-47 (1982) (discussing how judges belong to an “interpretive community” that subscribes to the rule of
law).
6

of appellate review. It stands to reason that a court that knows that its opinion will be
binding upon that court, and possibly also on lower courts, in the future will consider
more carefully its reasoning before issuing judgments and opinions that announce new
rules of law.18 Relatedly, the focus on cases that raise novel legal questions should allow
appellate courts to conserve judicial resources, apply them in cases in which they are
truly needed, and thus to reach correct answers more frequently.19
A fifth factor that many commentators identify as an ingredient of judicial quality
is judicial independence.20 Judges who enjoy greater independence, it is said, are less
likely to be swayed by irrelevant, nonjudicial concerns. The American Founding Fathers
subscribed to this view,21 and accordingly vested Article III judges with presumptive life
tenure and the guarantee of nonreduction in salary.22

Even if goals other than arriving at the correct outcome motivate judges, see, e.g., Erin O’Hara, Social
Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 736 (1993) (arguing that judges’ self-interest—including judges’ interest in expanding their
influence—explains the development of horizontal stare decisis); infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text,
the fact remains that, to the extent that the U.S. judicial system substantially relies on the traditional
hierarchical form and rules, the extent to which a court comports with that norm will increase the
perception that it is reaching correct decisions.
18
See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1623 (“In a completely decentralized system each judge would
have to attend to the caseload of every other judge in order to identify appropriate cases for review; in a
hierarchical system, only the appellate judges need have a systemic perspective on caseload.”); cf. id. at
1620 (noting that, absent horizontal precedent, “each judge is more likely to give each case intensive
consideration” (emphasis added)); id. at 1624 (arguing in favor of “strict vertical precedent because the
hierarchical structure creates a division of labor between levels of the hierarchy”); id. at 1625-27 (arguing
in favor of horizontal precedent at the appellate, but not the trial, level).
19
See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1622-24; Caminker, supra note 13, at 839-43. Of course, a cost in
such a system is that the first court may resolve the legal question incorrectly, and then bind future courts to
that rule. See O’Hara, supra note 17, at 737 n.3 (identifying the “primary social cost of stare decisis” as
“the entrenchment of bad decisions”); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare
Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989) (discussing reliance by a court on earlier decisions by that court,
even if wrongly decided, as an optimization problem and as varying depending upon institutional
structure).
There are other social benefits that rules of stare decisis provide—certainty, predictability, fairness,
and consistency. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 843-56 (discussing the desire to avoid “delayed justice,”
the greater decisionmaking proficiency of superior courts, and uniform interpretation and application of law
as consequentialist justifications for stare decisis); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 74-78 (discussing the
fairness, competence, and certainty as justifications for stare decisis). These benefits, however, are not the
result of the courts necessarily reaching correct conclusions. Indeed, these benefits would inhere if courts
uniformly reached bad decisions. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 3, at 105 (contrasting consistency,
soundness, and coherence).
20
See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence
from the American States, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 399, 422-24 (2006) (finding a strong correlation between
judicial independence and court quality); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2168, 2171 (2006). But see Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and
Economic Development 1 (USC Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. C06-1, 2006) (“There
is some evidence that judicial independence is associated with economic growth, but the evidence is mixed
and causation is unclear.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490.
21
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 81 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
22
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
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II. INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE AND THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
At its essence, an appeal involves a claim that a trial court committed some form
of error—for example, failure to follow proper procedure or improper application of the
law. Accordingly, we might say that one of the primary functions of an appellate court, if
not the core function, is to ascertain whether the alleged error truly occurred. As we have
already discussed, theorists have posited various attributes that improve the quality of
appellate review. While plausible that some of these factors may contribute more than
others to improving the quality of appellate review, it seems reasonable to conclude that,
on balance, as between two different appellate tribunals, the one that has more of the
features of quality appellate review will better perform the appellate function.
The two-tiered system of bankruptcy appeals strikes us as an excellent field for an
empirical investigation of how alternative appellate structures may affect the quality of
appellate review. The current appellate structure provides for appeals of bankruptcy
court decisions in “core” bankruptcy proceedings to be heard, in the alternative, by two
different appellate tribunals—federal district courts and federal bankruptcy appellate
panels (commonly referred to as “BAPs”). Of particular interest for purposes of this
Article, based on the criteria we identified above in Part I, we identify the BAP as the
stronger of the two appellate courts—that is, better equipped to carry out the core
appellate function of identifying alleged error. We investigate this hypothesis through the
study of appeals in core bankruptcy proceedings. We seek to unearth evidence that will
inform scholarly inquiry into the hallmarks of the quality of appellate review and that will
illuminate areas warranting further exploration.
This part sets the backdrop for our empirical study. First, we describe the
bankruptcy judicial structure with primary emphasis on the manner in which appeals
progress through it. We then discuss our approach for empirically investigating the
theoretical proposition that BAPs are the stronger of the two appellate courts in
performing appellate function at the first tier of review and develop a series of hypotheses
to test the theory.
A.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Process

Unlike any other part of the federal judicial system, the bankruptcy appeals
process routinely involves two levels of intermediate review. This anomalous state of
affairs can be traced to congressional reform efforts from the 1970s that sought to
improve the quality of the bankruptcy court while simultaneously maintaining it in a
subordinate relationship to the district court.23
Under the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act of
1898,24 district courts delegated much of their responsibility over bankruptcy cases to
“bankruptcy referees,” individuals appointed by a panel of district judges for a six-year
23

See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV.
47, 123 (1997) (noting that “double appeal system was a concession to the federal judges, a symbol of the
subordination of the bankruptcy court to the district court”).
24
See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
8

term.25 The limited role and status of the referees at the inception of the Bankruptcy Act
expanded over time, which in turn increased the cadre of full-time judicial officers
involved in the administration of bankruptcy cases.26 Eventually, the rules of bankruptcy
procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1973 redesignated referees as
“bankruptcy judges.”27 This change, however, did not remove the distinction between
bankruptcy judges and Article III judges, including, for example, “prohibitions against
bankruptcy judges using the elevators, parking lots, and dining rooms reserved for Article
III judges.”28 Moreover, some Article III judges continued to refer to bankruptcy judges
as “referees” in spite of the statutory change.29 Sentiments such as these infused their way
into the policymaking debates over bankruptcy reform in the 1970s.
Congress established in 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States to analyze the Bankruptcy Act and to suggest recommendations for its
reform.30 While the original resolution creating the Commission proposed that the Chief
Justice would appoint two bankruptcy judges as commissioners, strident opposition led,
among others, by District Judge Edward Weinfeld, chair of the Judicial Conference’s
Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, resulted in passage of the
resolution without constraints on whom the Chief Justice could appoint.31 The Chief
Justice did not to appoint any bankruptcy judges to the Commission, instead appointing
Judge Weinfeld and District Judge Hubert Will.32 Judge Weinfeld’s efforts had the result
of excluding bankruptcy judges from engaging in policymaking discussions on
bankruptcy reform within the organizational framework of both the Commission and the
Judicial Conference.33 That the federal judiciary went to great lengths to oppose the
inclusion of bankruptcy judges in the reform process highly suggests that Article III
judges feared loss of power and prestige in the event Congress increased the power of
bankruptcy judges.34 It is this dynamic that underlies the current bankruptcy judicial
structure and the anomaly of double appeals. Only one level of intermediate appellate
25

Posner, supra note 23, at 61-62.
See Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress and the Passage of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978 (pt. 1), 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3-6 (2007)
27
BANKR. R. 901(7) (1973) (repealed 1978).
28
Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial
Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1985). Hearsay evidence suggests
that at least one Article III judge viewed bankruptcy judges as occupying the professional status equivalent
to a janitor. See Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34 (“Former Bankruptcy Judge Herb Katz recalls: ‘I am
told—this is hearsay—but Judge Chambers, who was at the Ninth Circuit, chief judge, was asked by
somebody . . . [why] bankruptcy judges were not allowed to come to the Judicial Conference. And he was
alleged to have said, “If I invite those people, I have to invite the janitors as well.”’” (omission and
alteration in original) (quoting Interview with Herbert Katz (July 1, 2004))).
29
Posner, supra note 23, at 61 & n.25; cf. Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34 (“As late as 1978, even
though Judge James Browning, then chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, specifically invited five bankruptcy
judges to attend the circuit conference, Senior District Judge Lloyd George (formerly a bankruptcy judge)
reports that ‘they wouldn’t call me “judge.” They called me mister.’” (quoting Interview with Lloyd
George (Dec. 20, 2004))).
30
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970)
31
Mund, supra note 26, at 7.
32
Id. at 8.
33
Id. at 8.
34
See Posner, supra note 23, at 8.
26
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review would have been needed had Congress made bankruptcy judges co-equals with
district court judges, but that was not to be the case.
With enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,35 Congress effectuated a
complete overhaul of the federal bankruptcy system that had been in place for 80 years.
While there were proposals to vest bankruptcy judges with Article III status,36 Congress
ultimately rejected that notion, at least in part with the support of current and former
Article III judges.37 Congress instead decided to establish the bankruptcy courts as
“adjuncts” of the federal district courts. Bankruptcy jurisdiction was statutorily vested in
the district courts, yet the statute also directed that all of that jurisdiction was to be
exercised by the bankruptcy courts, which were to be staffed by Article I judges.38
The Supreme Court rejected the 1978 Act’s jurisdictional structure in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.39 The Court in Marathon held that
the 1978 Act violated Article III by vesting federal judicial power in Article I bankruptcy
judges. The Marathon decision forced Congress to repair the constitutional infirmity.
Lobbying by Article III judges led Congress yet again to reject a solution of affording
bankruptcy judges Article III status.40 Instead, Congress simply modified the 1978
structure. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 statutorily
established the bankruptcy judges, who are appointed by the courts of appeals,41 as
“unit[s]” of the district courts.42 Thus, parties technically should file bankruptcy cases in
federal district court. However, the Act authorized each district court to “refer” “any or
all cases” or “proceedings” to the bankruptcy judges.43 District courts in turn have
implemented “standing orders” that refer in the first instance bankruptcy cases to the
bankruptcy courts.44

35

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended primarily
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
36
See Countryman, supra note 28, at 7-8.
37
See id. at 8-9; Posner, supra note 23, at 77 (“The federal judges opposed the creation of more
independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their appointment power over bankruptcy
judges, and thus one of their main patronage opportunities, and (2) their status would be diluted through the
vast increase in the number of federal judicial positions.”).
Interestingly, as Congress considered various proposals for reorganizing the court structure of the
bankruptcy system in its reform efforts from the 1970s that led to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,
bankruptcy judges did not seek Article III status. Instead, they lobbied Congress for appointment by the
judicial council, rather than the president, for two reasons: First, they believed their merit would be
properly recognized in a nonpolitical judicial appointment process; and, second, they feared that sitting
judges would lack the political connections necessary for presidential appointment. See Mund, supra note
26, at 20-21, 24-25, 29. For a political economic analysis of the 1978 Act’s treatment of bankruptcy judges,
see Posner, supra note 23, at 74-94.
38
See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976).
39
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
40
See Countryman, supra note 28, at 31.
41
28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
42
28 U.S.C. § 151; see also 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (“Bankruptcy judges shall serve as judicial officers
of the United States district court established under Article III of the Constitution.”).
43
28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
44
9 AM. JUR. 2d (Bankruptcy) § 731; Bussel, supra note 13, at 1066 & n.12.
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In determining the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s authority to resolve a dispute
within a bankruptcy case,45 it is necessary under to categorize the proceeding as “core” or
non-core. Absent the consent of all parties, bankruptcy judges may only issue
recommendations for the resolution of non-core proceedings, with de novo district court
review upon objection by either party.46 Appellate review thereafter lies to the
appropriate federal court of appeals, and thence to the Supreme Court, in line with the
typical federal appellate hierarchy.47
Core proceedings, on the other hand, are those that, in effect, lie at the heart of a
bankruptcy case,48 and that bankruptcy judges are empowered to resolve definitively, in
the first instance, with appellate review to follow.49 Here, however, there may be more
than one possible appellate path.
The statute authorizes the judicial council of each circuit to establish a
“bankruptcy appellate panel”—commonly known as a “BAP”—comprised of bankruptcy
judges from that circuit.50 BAPs are now constituted—and have been constituted since
45

Disputes in bankruptcy cases generally assume one of two forms: (1) an adversary proceeding or (2)
a contested matter. Adversary proceedings include, for example, a proceeding to recover money or
property, a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien, a proceeding to object to or
revoke a discharge; and a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt. See FED. R. BANKR. P.
7001. Such proceedings begin and go forward much as would any other federal lawsuit insofar as Part VII
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which governs such proceedings, virtually incorporates the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (occasionally with some modifications). See, e.g., id. 7003 (Fed. R. Civ.
P. 3); id. 7004(a) (portions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4); id. 7005 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 5); id. 7012(b) (Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)-(h)); id. 7013 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 13); id. 7014 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 14); id. 7056 (Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56). Disputes between parties that are not adversary proceedings are called “contested matters,”
and they proceed according to less complex procedures than adversary proceedings—including request for
relief by motion rather than the filing of a complaint See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014; see also Khachikyan v.
Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“In a contested matter, there is no
summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed, counterclaims and third-party practice do not apply,
and much pre-trial procedure is either foreshortened or dispensed with in the interest of time.”).
46
The Judicial Code describes a non-core proceeding as “a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but
is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
47
Caminker, supra note 13, at 824-25 (discussing the standard federal appellate court hierarchy).
48
Section 157(b)(1) speaks of “core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title
11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). In turn, section 157(b)(2) lists examples of core proceedings, which include
matters concerning (1) administration of the estate, (2) the allowance of claims, (3) objections to discharge,
and (4) plan confirmation. Id. § 157(b)(2).
49
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Unless, that is, the district court withdraws the reference to the bankruptcy
court. See id. § 157(d). In that case, the district court hears the matter in the first instance, with appeals in
the ordinary course lying to the court of appeals and then the Supreme Court. See Bussel, supra note 13, at
1067, 1100.
50
28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The statute also authorizes the creation of intercircuit BAPs, see id.
§ 158(b)(4), but none has yet been created.
Much as the bankruptcy court is unit of the district court, the bankruptcy appellate panels may be seen
as "a unit of the federal courts of appeals." Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Federal Judiciary—
United States Courts of Appeals, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals/bap.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (requiring BAPs to be established, and BAP judges to be appointed,
by the circuit judicial council); B.A.P. 8th Cir. R. 8016A(a)(1) ("The Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit shall serve as the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for
the Eighth Circuit."). Compare Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149
B.R. 614, 620-21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (describing BAP as unit of the court of appeals), with The
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1996—in the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.51 For a circuit BAP to be
empowered to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts in a given district, a majority of
district judges in the district must vote to authorize it.52 Unless a party elects otherwise,
appeals of bankruptcy judges’ rulings in core proceedings will lie to the BAP (in those
circuits that have created them and in districts that have authorized it).53 Appeals from
BAP rulings lie to the court of appeals.54 Parties may seek, as usual, discretionary review
by the Supreme Court of rulings by the court of appeals.
If either the appellant or the appellee so elects—or if the circuit has not created a
BAP or, even if it has, if the district court in question has not voted to authorize BAP
appeals—then the district court—in the person of a single district judge—initially hears
appeals of bankruptcy court rulings in core proceedings.55 The judgment of the district
court may then be appealed to the appropriate federal court of appeals,56 with
discretionary Supreme Court review the remaining appellate step. In short, then, certain
parties in some circuits have an option between two possible appellate paths.57 We
illustrate this in Figure 1.58
Honorable Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on Any Court?, 18
CAL. BANKR. J. 189, 197 (1990) (describing BAP as unit of district court).
51
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were designed to encourage circuit courts to create
BAPs by directing that each circuit “shall establish” a BAP unless the circuit judicial council finds that
existing judicial resources are insufficient to establish one or that its establishment would result in undue
delay or increased cost to parties in cases under the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The six
regional circuits that voted against establishing BAPs “concluded that the appellate process was functioning
well as already constituted and that BAPs would create undue delay or increase the cost of appeals.” The
Honorable Henry J. Boroff, The Precedential Effect of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM.
L.J. 212, 214 n.10 (1998) (citing Elizabeth Abbott, Bankruptcy Review Panel Makes Debut, NAT’L L.J.,
Mar. 3, 1997, at B1).
On the history of BAPs, see Bryan T. Camp, Bound by the BAP: The Stare Decisis Effects of BAP
Decisions, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1643, 1648-60 (1997); infra note 75.
52
28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). In the mid-1990s, when a Second Circuit BAP was in existence, “only three
districts participate[d]—and these together typically receive less than a third of all bankruptcy petitions
filed in the Second Circuit.” Camp, supra note 51, at 1660. These facts, presumably, played a large role in
the ultimate decision to disband the Second Circuit BAP.
53
28 U.S.C. § 158(c).
54
28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
55
28 U.S.C. § 158(a). See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units”
Faring?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 105, 108 (2005) (“Appeals from bankruptcy courts to the district court . . . have
steadily declined over sixteen years from 4300 in 1988 to 2800 in 2004, attributable, in part, to the
establishment of bankruptcy appellate panels in four of the circuits.”).
56
28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
57
See generally Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation in
Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483, 490-500 (elucidating the differences between the standard federal
judicial hierarchy and the bankruptcy appellate system); Camp, supra note 51, at 1644 (“BAPs . . . shake up
the normal hierarchical structure dear to many attorneys’ hearts.”).
58
We should note that a third possible appellate path not yet discussed—that of direct appeal from the
bankruptcy court to the court of appeals—exists for a limited set of circumstances. By virtue of amendment
to the Judicial Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, appeal may proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification
procedure if one of the following circumstances exists: (1) the appeal involves a question of law unresolved
by the court of appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (2) the appeal involves a matter of public
importance; (3) the appeal involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions, or (4)
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FIGURE 1
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE FOR CORE PROCEEDINGS

Discretionary Final Review:
Supreme Court

Second-Tier
Intermediate Review:
Court of Appeals
First-Tier
Intermediate Review:
(Possibility 1)

First-Tier
Intermediate Review:
(Possibility 2)

District Court

BAP

Initial Determination:
Bankruptcy Court

It seems, a priori, that BAPs have more of the features of quality appellate review
in greater amounts than do the federal district courts. First, bankruptcy appellate panels
are collegial bodies, who decide cases in three-judge panels. Indeed, bankruptcy judges
who serve on BAPs themselves believe that decision by a panel of judges is beneficial.59
By contrast, bankruptcy appeals to district courts are heard by a single district judge.
Second, the bankruptcy judges who comprise bankruptcy appellate panels are (by
virtue of their appointment as bankruptcy judges) presumably experts in bankruptcy
law.60 Thus, they are well suited to resolve legal issues that might arise in core
the appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken. 28
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).
59
Mabey, supra note 55, at 123 (“Several [surveyed bankruptcy judges] acknowledged that they find
the collaborative effort and consensus-building required for service on the BAP challenging and very
different from what they are used to as single, independent bankruptcy judges but, at the same time,
beneficial, because it makes them more patient and more effective in writing decisions.”).
60
See, e.g., Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy
practitioners in their prior careers.”); see also id. at 123 (noting that, of a random survey of bankruptcy
judges in 2005, “[a]bout 83% . . . were bankruptcy practitioners before taking the bankruptcy bench” and
that, “[o]f the 17% . . . who were not bankruptcy practitioners, almost all came from a business law
background, as commercial litigators or corporate transactional lawyers,” and further noting that the
13

bankruptcy proceedings.61 District judges, by contrast, are not generally versed in
bankruptcy law.62
The third factor—“other” lawfinding ability63—appears to favor neither district
judges nor bankruptcy appellate panels. Attorneys filing appellate briefs may focus on the
legal issues without the distractions of trial advocacy, presumably whether the briefs will
be filed with the district court or appellate panel. Similarly, both district judges and
bankruptcy appellate panels hear legal issues once a factual record has been established.
Last, while district judges and bankruptcy judges both preside over trials, neither the
district judge hearing a bankruptcy appeal, nor bankruptcy judges sitting on a bankruptcy
appellate panel, are presiding over trials at that time.64
Fourth, bankruptcy appellate panels conform to traditional notions of appellate
review: Their rulings are generally seen to be binding on future bankruptcy appellate
panels drawn from the same circuit.65 Further, at least one BAP has held that its decisions
surveyed bankruptcy judges felt that their prior experience was very helpful on the bench); cf. id. at 113-16
(discussing the trend among bankruptcy judges to hire more permanent, as opposed to term, law clerks, and
noting that those bankruptcy judges who preferred permanent clerks often hired clerks with legal
experience, and in particular practice experience in bankruptcy law).
61
See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“[T]he BAP is desirable because it allows specialist
bankruptcy judges to replace nonspecialist federal judges.”).
62
One might argue that even district judges with no experience in bankruptcy experience before
ascending to the bench gain some experience by virtue of hearing a steady stream of bankruptcy cases. A
study by the Federal Judicial Center of the bankruptcy appellate structure, however, reached the opposite
conclusion, observing that “[t]he number of first-level reviewers greatly exceeds the number of bankruptcy
judges producing the judgments reviewed, and appellate caseloads are spread thinly among district judges,
giving few judges much opportunity to develop bankruptcy expertise.” Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C.
Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 627 (2002).
63
We employ the modifier “other” because, as noted above, the Court suggested that the use of
multijudge panels is “[p]erhaps most important” in assessing lawfinding ability. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
64
It is this factor that, presumably, vests district judges with lawfinding ability when they sit by
designation on court of appeals panels. See Nash, Resuscitating Deference, supra note 1, at 1031
(explaining that the better term is lawfinding “ability” and not lawfinding “expertise”).
One might argue that lawfinding ability is enhanced to the extent that the judge (whether district or
bankruptcy) enjoys relief from her other responsibilities while hearing appeals. This seems not to be the
case, however, at least for bankruptcy judges:
When asked how BAP service affects their service as a bankruptcy judge, several of the [surveyed
bankruptcy judges] indicated that it required adjustments to their bankruptcy court trial and hearing
schedule and that it substantially added to their workload. Some of the Survey Participants suggested that
those bankruptcy judges who serve full-time on the BAP should have the option of employing an additional
law clerk. One Survey Participant indicated that service on the BAP was “like having a second job.”
Mabey, supra note 55, at 122 (footnote omitted); see also Honorable Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of
the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1330 (1993)
(“The fundamental truth which is the basis for this article is that the bankruptcy caseload in many districts
in this country is so overwhelming that the bankruptcy judges are sorely pressed in the struggle to cope
with it.”).
65
BAPs in three circuits—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth—have reached this conclusion. E.g., In re
Luedtke, 215 B.R. 390, 391 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (BAP bound by prior decisions, citing circuit court
cases saying that circuit court panels bind subsequent circuit court panels); Ball v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits,
Inc. (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595, 597 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“We will not overrule our prior rulings unless a
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Supreme Court decision or subsequent legislation has undermined
14

are binding on all bankruptcy courts within that circuit,66 even if the bankruptcy courts
themselves do not share this view.67 In contrast, one district judge is generally seen to be
under no obligation to follow the ruling of another district judge—even one in the same
district—whether on matters of bankruptcy or otherwise.68 And bankruptcy courts have
those rulings.”); Salomon N. Am. v. Knupfer (In re Wind N’ Wave), 328 B.R. 176, 181 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005) (reaffirming that the BAP will not overrule its prior rulings unless an intervening circuit court or
Supreme Court decision, or subsequent legislation, undermines those rulings); Concannon v. Imperial Cap.
Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 95 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (same); In re Blagg, 223 B.R. 795, 804
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (“Our decision is dictated by the principle that we are bound by prior panel
decisions. A panel cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of the court.”), appeal dismissed, 198
F.3d 257 (10th Cir. 1999); Smolen v. Hatley (In re Hatley), 227 B.R. 757, 761 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998)
(same), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir. 1999).
66
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot (In re Proudfoot), 144 B.R. 876, 879 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992)
(“BAP decisions originating in any district in the Ninth Circuit are binding precedent on all bankruptcy
courts within the Ninth Circuit in the absence of any contrary authority from the district court for the
district in which the bankruptcy court sits.”); In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1987) (“One of the reasons for establishing the BAP was to provide a uniform and consistent body of
bankruptcy law throughout the entire Circuit. In order to achieve this desired uniformity, the decisions of
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel must be binding on all of the bankruptcy courts from which review may be
sought, i.e. each district in the Ninth Circuit.”), rev’d on other grounds, 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988).
67
Compare, e.g., Ore. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 B.R. 59, 62 (D.
Ore. 1990) (BAP decisions bind only those bankruptcy courts sitting in the district out of which the appeal
arose), with Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 255 B.R. 267 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000)
(rejecting argument that substantial motivation of Congress in creating BAPs was to generate a uniform
body of bankruptcy law within the circuits; concluding that there is no principled reason why decisions of a
BAP should have more precedential authority than those of district courts; odd and unseemly, if not
unconstitutional, for a BAP—comprised of three Article I judges—to be generating for bankruptcy judges,
and perhaps also for district judges, the law of the circuit until the circuit court had spoken); In re Virden,
279 B.R. 401, 409 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (same), and Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat),
173 B.R. 672, 676-80 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that BAPs bind bankruptcy courts on matters arising in core proceedings even though district
courts do not). For further discussion regarding the precedential effect of BAP decisions, see Salomon N.
Am., 328 B.R. at 181 n.2 (noting the Ninth Circuit BAP’s prior holding that its decisions bind our
bankruptcy courts within the circuit, but also recognizing that some bankruptcy courts have rejected that
holding); Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1989) (“BAP decisions cannot
bind the district courts themselves. As article III courts, the district courts must always be free to decline to
follow BAP decisions and to formulate their own rules within their jurisdiction.”); id. at 472 (O’Scannlain,
J., concurring) (“writ[ing] separately to propose that the Judicial Council of this Circuit consider adoption
of an order requiring that Bankruptcy Appellate Panel . . . decisions shall bind all of the bankruptcy courts
of the circuit, subject to the restrictions imposed by article III so well discussed in the [court’s] opinion”);
Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing
“binding nature of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decisions” as “an open question,” and “join[ing] Judge
O’Scannlain’s call for the [Ninth Circuit] Judicial Council to consider an order clarifying whether the
bankruptcy courts must follow the BAP”); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved
Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 529 (1995) (“Even stronger
arguments can be made against any stare decisis effect at all for the opinion of a bankruptcy appellate
panel.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129-30 (“I would argue that district courts should be bound by
BAP decisions. The view that an Article I court can never bind an Article III court is an overstatement.”);
Trujillo, supra note 57, at 494 n.23 (arguing that BAPs function as district courts, and accordingly cannot
issue binding opinions).
68
See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 67, at 529 (noting that “[n]one of the district judges is bound by a
bankruptcy appeals decision of a district judge from one of the other 93 district courts” and that “district
judges in multi-judge districts are not even bound by the bankruptcy appeals decisions of other judges from
that same district”). But see Bussel, supra note 13, at 1095-96 (“Even where review lies in a district court
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held that they are not bound at least by the holding of a single district judge on a
multijudge district court.69 As such, BAPs comport more with the standard model of
appellate hierarchy than do district courts sitting on appeal.70
composed of more than one judge, rather than a BAP, uncertain and disuniform development of bankruptcy
law is mitigated by a long tradition within district courts of deviating from a co-ordinate judge’s prior
decision only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Given this bias, relatively few district judges—in
comparison to the specialist bankruptcy courts—have enough interest and confidence in their views of
bankruptcy law to be willing to create conflicts within the district. In any event, the problem of intra-district
conflict could be eliminated if the federal district courts would adopt “law-of-the-district” rules for
bankruptcy appeals analogous to the “law-of-the-circuit” rules currently in effect, in most regions, at the
Court of Appeals level. All district courts might be bound by a published precedent within the district in
subsequent bankruptcy appeals.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 1096 n.116 (“I am aware of only a
handful of cases where district judges in the same district adopt differing views of the same question of
bankruptcy law and in those cases one or both of the decisions is unpublished.”).
69
See, e.g., In re Romano, 350 B.R. 276, 281 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005) (“[A] single decision of a district
court in this multi-judge district is not binding upon this court.”); id. at 277-81 (summarizing authority both
ways); Paul Steven Singerman & Paul A. Avron, Of Precedents and Bankruptcy Court Independence, 22
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2003) (noting conflict, gathering authorities, and finding that a majority of
bankruptcy courts have held that they are not bound by the decision of a single district court judge in a
multi-judge district); Trujillo, supra note 57, at 494 (arguing that bankruptcy decision by one bankruptcy
judge cannot bind other bankruptcy judges in the same district, and that bankruptcy decision by one district
judge cannot bind other district judges or any bankruptcy judges in the same district). But see Chemerinsky,
supra note 4, at 129 (“While a district court exercising original jurisdiction cannot bind other district
courts, its decisions should be binding on bankruptcy courts when the district court is serving as an appeals
court.”).
70
Our point here is simply that BAPs seem to fit more cleanly into the standard hierarchical appellate
model than do district courts sitting on appeal, not that that is necessarily mandated under the current
statutory scheme or normatively desirable. The latter two points are debatable.
With respect to the current statutory scheme, there are statements in the legislative history indicating
that Congress created the BAPs to help foster greater uniformity in bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 140 CONG.
REC. S14,463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (“It should be recognized that the creation
of a bankruptcy appellate panel service can help to establish a dependable body of case law.”). But see
Daly, 255 B.R. at 273 (“Any suggestion that Congress’ authorization of the creation of BAP Services was
motivated substantially by its desire to create a uniform body of bankruptcy law within the circuits is not
supported by the BAP Service’s history, which instead suggests that BAPs were conceived primarily as a
tool for relieving district court judges of an ofttimes undesirable and burdensome aspect of their
workload.”). At the same time, one can point to the certification procedure in section 158(d)(2)—under
which courts of appeals may decide interlocutory appeals when, among other circumstances, the question
raised is one “as to which there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the
Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)—as evidence that Congress chose other,
explicit means of increasing bankruptcy law uniformity. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 148 (2005)
(“[D]ecisions rendered by a district court as well as a bankruptcy appellate panel are generally not binding
and lack stare decisis value. To address these problems, [the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005] amends section 158(d) of title 28 to establish a procedure to facilitate appeals of
certain decisions, judgments, orders and decrees of the bankruptcy courts to the circuit courts of appeals by
means of a two-step certification process.”), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 206.
Commentators are divided over whether BAP decisions bind bankruptcy courts. Compare, e.g., Bussel,
supra note 13, at 1098 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should consider both BAP and district court
decisions as binding precedent); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“From [a] functional perspective, I
think that BAP decisions clearly should be binding on bankruptcy courts.”); Camp, supra note 51, at 167684 (arguing that BAPs should bind both bankruptcy and district courts) with Trujillo, supra note 57, at 492
(“[O]nly opinions of the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court bind bankruptcy courts by
reason of formal hierarchy.”); cf. Caminker, supra note 13, at 870-72 (arguing that theoretical
considerations argue in favor of bankruptcy courts being bound by district court decisions). Moreover,
16

strict application of vertical stare decisis is difficult, insofar as it is not certain until after the bankruptcy
court has issued judgment into which appellate path the case will proceed. Cf. Camp, supra note 51, at
1682 (“Since bankruptcy judges do not know at the time they make a decision whether it will be a BAP or a
district court that will hear any appeal, and since no district court has so far considered itself bound by a
BAP, it is no surprise that many bankruptcy judges feel free to disregard BAP decisions.”). (Compare this
to the United States Tax Court, which considers itself bound by its own precedent, except insofar as it has
also held that it is bound “to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal
from [the] decision lies to that Court of Appeals.” Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), aff’d,
445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Because the court of appeals to which a taxpayer will appeal is determined
by his state of residence, see 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a), (b), it is always clear at the time of decision which
circuit’s precedent is binding.)
As to the normative question, there are those who argue that an increase in application of stare decisis
would be normatively desirable. See, e.g., The Honorable Henry J. Boroff, The Precedential Effect of
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM. L.J. 212, 221 (1998) (arguing that the current dual track
appellate system makes it difficult to generate binding precedent, and that the system be changed to allow
for development of binding precedent); Bussel, supra note 13, at 1095 n.114 (“[L]ogically . . . district
courts . . . as well as bankruptcy courts might be bound by prior BAP decisions.”). However, there also are
strong arguments that a structure other than the standard appellate hierarchy might be desirable. First, one
of the bases on which the pyramidal appellate hierarchy functions is the notion that issues “percolate” up
from the lower courts to the higher courts. It is the desire for percolation that, commentators argue, restricts
(and properly so) application of horizontal stare decisis to the same court and not to sibling courts of equal
hierarchical stature. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 834 (1990) (“The rejection of intercircuit stare decisis is
premised upon—and given the obvious costs in deferring uniformity, is explainable only in terms of—the
benefits of dialogue among the circuits.”); see also Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1352 (1995) (arguing, based upon social choice
theory, that the Supreme Court “would desire intra- but not inter-circuit stare decisis,” since such a regime
“avoids the irrationality that would result from cyclical preferences within particular circuits, while, at the
same time, reducing the likelihood that legal doctrine that results from path manipulation in a given circuit
will be replicated across the circuits.”). But cf. O’Hara, supra note 17, at 772 (arguing that the absence of
stare decisis across circuits is justified on the ground that “an agreement to follow another circuit’s
precedents will not save the judges in a particular circuit much time”). In the case of appeals of core
bankruptcy matters, there are, anomalously, two levels of intermediate appeals. Perhaps, then, in order for
issues properly to percolate up to the courts of appeals, there ought to be no horizontal stare decisis at the
first intermediate level—i.e., at the level of the BAPs and district courts.
Second, given that the BAPs and district courts lie at the same hierarchical level, it might not make
sense for horizontal stare decisis rules to apply to BAPs but not district courts. Perhaps, once again,
horizontal stare decisis should not apply at all. (One might argue, to the contrary, that horizontal stare
decisis should apply to both courts. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129.)
Third, perhaps bankruptcy law and society would be better served by a system other than the
traditional appellate hierarchy, at the lower levels of appeals of core bankruptcy matters. Civil law systems
rely far less on precedent than does the common law system dominant in the United States. See supra note
15 and accompanying text. Civil law judiciaries decide cases based largely upon the proper interpretation
of the governing “code.” Insofar as bankruptcy turns upon the content of a code—the “Bankruptcy
Code”—bankruptcy seems to provide an ideal setting for application of such judicial review. Cf. Lawrence
Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy
Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 216 (2000)
(arguing for “a softer, more nimble, rule of precedent [that] would improve the quality of outcomes in
particular bankruptcy cases”). (Interestingly, while Ponoroff facially argues in favor of increased reliance
on a civil law jurisprudential approach in the bankruptcy context, his arguments do not seem to accord so
well with the principles underlying the structure of judicial review in civil law systems. Ponoroff laments:
“The opportunity for two levels of appeal as a matter of right has contributed to the crush of reported
decisions, a phenomenon that, in my view, has hampered pragmatic and considered decisionmaking in the
bankruptcy courts. That problem is compounded by the disturbing rise in adherence to textual or plain
meaning methods of interpretation in bankruptcy cases, particularly in the decisions of the circuit courts of
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It is only the final criterion—the question of judicial independence—on which
district courts have some advantage over bankruptcy appellate panels. Judicial
independence has been considered to be a function of life tenure and the guarantee of
nonreduction in salary. Both attributes have been enshrined in the Article III status
conferred on district judges, whereas bankruptcy judges who sit on bankruptcy appellate
panels do not get the benefit of either attribute by virtue of their Article I status.71
On this basis, one might readily conclude that district judges enjoy judicial
independence while bankruptcy judges do not. But this would be a facile conclusion that
improperly casts the assessment of judicial independence as an all-or-nothing
proposition—that is, judicial independence as attainable only through life tenure and the
guarantee of nonreducible remuneration. Careful consideration of the matter, however,

appeal[s].” Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted). Ponoroff thus seems more concerned with allowing different
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code to percolate up through the judiciary. He also seems to embrace
more of a realist conception of bankruptcy law than a civil law conception, explaining, “A more forwardlooking, and less technical and ‘busy,’ code would abate the pressure to decide and review cases on the
kind of formal, textualist grounds that typically prove the most difficult to distinguish in subsequent cases.”
Id. at 216. Indeed, Ponoroff acknowledges that he endorses “a different style of judging, one that eschews a
strict adherence to precedent, but not by any means civilian, to the extent that style is perceived as the
unimaginative and rote application of positive legal rules to particular fact situations performed by a cadre
of mid-level bureaucrats.” Id. at 223. “Rather,” he endorses “a style that actually places greater
responsibility on the decisionmaker to reason analogically from code principles, as well as from subsidiary
sources such as custom, usages, settled jurisprudential doctrine, and equity.” Id. at 223-24.)
To the possible objection that the fact that the higher levels of bankruptcy judicial review—courts of
appeals and the Supreme Court—rely upon the standard appellate hierarchy, one can point to the
coexistence of Louisiana’s civil law system within the United States judicial system as an example of how
such a system can function. See, e.g., Shelp v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964) (in determining
Louisiana law under Erie, federal courts should apply precedential rules that Louisiana state courts apply);
Alvin Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48
LA. L. REV. 1369 (1988) (article written by Fifth Circuit Judge endorsing Shelp). But see John Burnitt
McArthur, Good Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference Erie Rule for Louisiana State Court
Decisions, 66 LA. L. REV. 313 (2006). Indeed, the notion that bankruptcy courts do not consider themselves
bound by rulings of single district judges in multijudge districts—and therefore presumably do at some
point consider themselves bound once a number of district judges in the same district reach the same
conclusion—resembles the “jurisprudence constante” under which precedent develops in Louisiana and
other civil law systems. See, e.g., Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic
or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (describing jurisprudence constante as
a doctrine under which “a case may be used to discern a pattern [of decisions] that may aid in
interpretation”); Stearns, supra, at 1357 n.143 (discussing jurisprudence constante); cf. RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 257 (1985) (proposing, “as a special rule of stare
decisis, the practice that when the first three circuits to decide an issue have decided it the same way, the
remaining circuits defer to that decision”). Any potential difficulties in integrating a civil law precedential
model into the larger common law-based federal court system would be mitigated by the fact that the vast
majority of bankruptcy cases are not appealed beyond the first level of intermediate appellate review. See
Bussel, supra note 13, at 1091; cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that “[b]ankruptcy law
matters seem to fit in between . . . two poles” in that “bankruptcy statutes are filled with ambiguities that
require court interpretation,” while there also “probably exist particular types of disputes where the lawgiving function of the court is less important and alternative dispute resolution would be potentially more
efficient”). But cf. Bussel, supra note 13, at 1097 (“I would have difficulty understanding why Congress
would intend BAPs and district courts to serve merely as rest-stops on the road to real appellate review.”).
71
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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suggests that the difference may be narrower than that generally perceived by courts and
commentators.
A more felicitous account reveals that the term of appointment for bankruptcy
judges, the standard for their removal from office, the treatment afforded to their
compensation, and the manner of their appointment afford bankruptcy judges a moderate
amount of judicial independence. First, although bankruptcy judges do not get life tenure,
the term of their appointment lasts fourteen years.72 The appointments, moreover, may be
renewed,73 and indeed in most cases are renewed.74 While judicial independence may be
fostered by life tenure, the renewable, fourteen-year term of bankruptcy judges places
them in a position to serve as long as many of their Article III counterparts.75 Even if the
absence of life tenure gives Congress leeway to reduce the term of bankruptcy judges76—
an option that it has never exercised since it created the bankruptcy courts—still the
fourteen-year, renewable term certainly grants a fair amount of judicial independence to
bankruptcy judges.77
Second, the Judicial Code prescribes that a bankruptcy judge may be removed
“only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability,”78
whereas the Constitution mandates that an Article III will hold his or her office only
“during good Behaviour.”79 The broad language of the good-behavior standard for
removal arguably encompasses the grounds set forth by the Judicial Code for removal of
bankruptcy judges. Moreover, while Article III judges may be removed only by
impeachment80 and bankruptcy judges may be removed by a majority of all of the judges
72

See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 303, 110 Stat. 3847, 3852
(providing that, “[w]en filling vacancies, the court of appeals may consider reappointing incumbent
bankruptcy judges under procedures prescribed by regulations issued by the Judicial Conference of the
United States”).
74
See Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (noting that, of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench in the
decade prior to 2005, only 10 did so as a result of not being reappointed); see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations § 1(e) (June 2001) (providing that
“[t]he court of appeals shall decide whether or not to reappoint the incumbent [bankruptcy] judge before
considering other potentially qualified candidates” (emphasis added)).
To the contrary, one might argue that the fact that bankruptcy judges must seek, and generally receive,
reappointment, demonstrates the absence of judicial independence.
75
Article III judges (other than Supreme Court Justices) whose service on the federal bench terminated
between 1983 and 2003 served, on average, 24 years. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic
Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 618 chart 4 (2005).
76
While Congress may reduce the duration of the fixed-term appointment for bankruptcy judges at any
point it so desires via statute, the constitutionally-guaranteed life tenure granted to Article III judges could
only be stripped away via constitutional amendment (an exponentially more difficult proposition).
77
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC.
NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 95 (1973) (proposing various reforms “to enhance the real and apparent judicial
independence of bankruptcy judges,” including “[e]xtension of the term of the bankruptcy judges from the
present six years to the proposed fifteen years.”); cf. Nash, supra note 20, at 2196 (observing that “one can
question the degree to which life tenure in fact secures for judges a larger measure of judicial
independence”).
78
28 U.S.C. § 152(e).
79
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
80
No. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (“The ‘good Behaviour’ Clause guarantees that Art. III judges shall enjoy life tenure, subject only
73
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of the judicial council of the circuit within which the bankruptcy judge has been
designated to serve,81 yet the practical reality is that very few bankruptcy judges have
been removed from office.82 If the specter of removal from office does not appear to be
greater for bankruptcy judges than Article III judges, it follows that bankruptcy judges
need not limit their behavior in such a way that would prevent them from acting as
independently as an Article III judge.
Third, although the Supreme Court has identified the “fixed and irreducible”
compensation provided to Article III judges by the Compensation Clause as a hallmark of
an independent judiciary,83 the lack of a similar guarantee in the salary of bankruptcy
judges should not be overemphasized in assessing their judicial independence. Since
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and created the current scheme for
federal bankruptcy judgeships, the salary of bankruptcy judges has only increased.84
Moreover, as of 1987, bankruptcy judges have received a salary at an annual rate that
equals 92 percent of the salary of a district court judge (as determined by section 135 of
the Judicial Code).85 Thus, for the past two decades, bankruptcy judges have had fixed
compensation that nearly equals that of their district court counterparts.
Finally, if one does not ignore the substantive differences in the appointment
processes of bankruptcy judges and district judges and the consequences that flow
therefrom, it becomes clear that bankruptcy judges may be better situated than district
judges to avoid and resist the political influence that would threaten to compromise an
independent judiciary. While the judicial appointment process for Article III judges has
become increasingly politicized, evidenced most recently by the tendency for close
examination of the ideology of nominees,86 the appointment process for bankruptcy
judges has seemingly remained apolitical. The Judicial Code charges the task of
appointing a bankruptcy judge to the court of appeals for the circuit in which there exists
a vacancy for a bankruptcy judgeship.87 Thus, the appointment process for bankruptcy
judges involves judges selecting judges—a presumably nonpolitical process.88 This
to removal by impeachment.”). But see Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal
Judge, 116 YALE. L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that federal judges may be removed from office by means other
than impeachment).
81
28 U.S.C. § 152(e).
82
See Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (listing reasons for departure from the bench for the 115
bankruptcy judges who did so in the decade prior to 2005, but not mentioning removal as one of those
reasons). On the other hand, one might argue that the low rate of removal of bankruptcy judges reflects the
absence of judicial independence: Bankruptcy judges have behaved in a way so as to avoid removal.
83
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 at 59 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
84
See Mabey, supra note 55, app. A.
85
28 U.S.C. § 153(a). Congress amended the Judicial Code in 1987 to provide for the current salary
structure for bankruptcy judges. Pub. L. No. 100-102, § 408 (1987).
86
See Nash, supra note 20, at 2182-92.
87
See 28 U.S.C § 152(a)(1), (3).
88
The possibility exists, however, that the judicial appointment of judges may substitute judicial
patronage for political patronage and thus compromise judicial independence. See Judith Resnik, “Uncle
Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the
District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 673 (2002) (“Article III created judicial
independence to avoid judges needing to curry favor in order to retain their jobs and their salaries. But
through the power of judicial appointment, judges now have something to give. Salaries, staff support,
courtrooms, chambers, committee assignments, and pensions come with magistrate and bankruptcy judge
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nonpolitical process has produced a bankruptcy bench mostly populated by specialists
with bankruptcy expertise,89 who themselves could be characterized as nonpolitical.90
When one considers the type of jurist produced by the judicial selection process
for bankruptcy judges in conjunction with their term of appointment, the standard for
their removal from office, and the treatment afforded to their compensation, it would
appear that bankruptcy judges have achieved a considerable degree of judicial
independence.91 Accordingly, while the district court seems to enjoy some advantage
over BAPs with respect to this final attribute that has been identified as improving the
quality of appellate review, the advantage is not likely to be a substantial one. We
summarize the differences in the attributes of the BAPs and district courts below in Table
1.

positions. As life-tenured judges become a source of patronage, applicants and their supporters have more
to gain by courting those judges.” (footnote omitted)). But see Posner, supra note 23, at 81-82
(“Appointments by the judicial branch are not as controversial, because judges belong to different
parties.”). Furthermore, one may argue that, insofar as the circuit judges are a product of a politicized
appointment process, they themselves may be politicized and thus infuse politics into the appointment
process for bankruptcy judges. The merit-selection process for appointing bankruptcy judges, however,
seems to have provided little opportunity for such politicization to take root. A quick look at the manner in
which the Ninth Circuit conducts this process (one that seems representative of the process conducted in
other circuits) suggests why this has been the case.
Interested candidates must submit applications for the position, see JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, Regulations Governing the Appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges § 2.02 (Mar. 21, 2001),
which the Circuit advertises nationally and which it encourages the federal judicial districts within the
circuit to advertise intensely and locally, see id. § 2.01. A local merit screening committee, which generally
consists of (1) the chief judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, (2) the
president of the state bar association, (3) the president of one or more local bar associations within the
district, (4) the dean of a law school located within the district, (5) the administrative circuit judge of the
circuit geographical unit in which the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, and (6) the chief bankruptcy
judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, see id. § 3.02(a), recommends to the
Court-Council Committee on Bankruptcy Appointments, whose membership includes three circuit judges
who serve as voting members, see id. § 3.04(b), five applicants who ought to be considered for
appointment, see id. § 3.03(c)(1). The Court-Council Committee circulates a report to the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council recommending a candidate for appointment, and that report will be deemed to be the
Judicial Council’s recommendation to the Court of Appeals (unless the Council determines that the CourtCouncil Committee should reconsider its recommendation). See id. §§ 3.04(c)(4); 3.05(a). The
recommended candidate is appointed upon a majority vote of the members of the Court of Appeals. 11
U.S.C § 152(a)(3).
89
See Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy practitioners in
their prior careers.”).
90
Cf. Resnik, supra note 88, at 670 (2002) (“Turn first to the advantages of judicial appointment of
judges. As a few details of current practices illustrate, the judiciary has selected a high-quality and
relatively nonpolitical corps of judges . . . .”).
91
This state of affairs can be traced to congressional efforts in the 1970s to elevate the status of
bankruptcy judges. Congress established in 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to evaluate the then-exisiting bankruptcy system and to suggest recommendations for its reform.
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). In its report, the Commission envisioned that improvements in the
appointment, tenure, and compensation of bankruptcy judges would enhance their “real and apparent
judicial independence.” See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt.1, at 95 (1973).
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TABLE 1
STRUCTURE OF DISTRICT COURTS AND BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANELS
First-Tier
Appellate
Court

Number of
Judges

Bankruptcy
Expertise

Other
Lawfinding
Ability

Traditional
Appellate
Hierarchy

Judicial
Independence

District Court

Single
judge

Unlikely

Some

Weak

Strong

Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel

Panel of
three
judges

Yes

Some

Strong

Moderate

B.

Hypotheses

Insofar as BAPs exhibit more of the features associated with quality appellate
review than do federal district courts, the discussion in Part I suggests that BAPs will
provide a greater quality of bankruptcy appellate review than their district court
counterparts—assuming, of course, that the question of judicial independence does not
outweigh other factors. Many challenges stand in the way of investigating this general
claim, chief among them the difficulty in empirically testing the “correctness” of the
dispositions rendered by the appellate court. Knowledge of this would be crucial for
purposes of ascertaining whether the appellate court had appropriately performed its
appellate function—that is, identifying error in those instances when it occurred. Making
such a determination would necessarily involve content analysis of appellate opinions
according to a particular metric of correctness. The difficulty in developing such a metric
would be the inherent subjectivity infused into its design. What we may deem to be a
“correct” decisions may be “incorrect” according to others. Accordingly, at the initial
stage of empirical inquiry, we are not persuaded that detailed content analysis of
appellate opinions is warranted.92
Absent detailed content analysis of appellate opinions, how might we empirically
proceed with our inquiry into the quality of appellate review? Although we cannot
empirically test the “correctness” of decisions, we can empirically test the perception
held by other actors within the bankruptcy judicial system of the correctness of those
decisions. For those bankruptcy appeals that proceed to the second tier of review, we can
consider whether the court of appeals deemed proper the disposition rendered by the firsttier appellate court.
92

Professor Frank Cross has expressed a similar view in his empirical study of decisions rendered by
U.S. Courts of Appeals. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 46-47
(2007) (“[T]here are typically nonfrivolous legal arguments for each side in circuit court cases, so it is
impossible to code certain cases as being legally correct (or incorrect) without the researcher secondguessing and effectively overriding the judge. Such an approach offers an unreliable tool for evaluating
judicial decisions because it probably reflects more about the researcher than about the judges being
evaluated. Research requires a more objective tool for evaluating the law.”).
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There are several ways in which the rate at which a higher court upholds a lower
court’s disposition may shed light upon judicial perceptions of correctness of lower court
decisions.93 First, there is a tautological sense in which what an appellate court says is, by
definition, correct (unless, that is, the appellate court decision is itself reversed). Thus, if
an appellate court affirms the disposition of a lower court, then the lower court’s
disposition was correct. Second, assume that the appellate court wishes to resolve the
legal issues “correctly” for the parties and for future courts.94 The law generally calls
upon appellate courts to examine legal issues de novo, without deference to the reasoning
or conclusion of the court below.95 Still, if the appellate court ultimately reaches the same
conclusion as the court below, then it is accurate to say that, judging from the appellate
court’s decision, the appellate court perceived the lower court’s conclusion to be
correct.96
Courts of appeals may not always affirm a decision because they believe the
earlier decision was “correct,” however. Judges need not be so selfless. Indeed, there is a
school of thought that views judges, like all people, as self-interested actors.97 Judges
may be interested in keeping their jobs—for bankruptcy judges, this translates to
reappointment. Insofar as district judges enjoy Article III status, they have life tenure and
are guaranteed not to suffer any salary reductions. Still, even Article III judges may have
dreams of higher office.98 Article III judges—and, for that matter, bankruptcy appellate
panels—may also wish to avoid the “ignominy” of reversal by a higher court.99
93

But cf. Polk & Petheridge, supra note 5, at 1127-28 (noting the limits of “result-oriented statistical
studies”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A New Window into the Behavior
of Judges? (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-29, 2006) (using empirical data to
argue that judges of one political party are more likely to cite opinions authored by judges of the same
party, especially in particular “high stakes” settings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913663.
94
See supra note 17.
95
See, e.g., Concannon v. Imperial Cap. Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2006) (“[W]e review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code
de novo.”); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. (In re Valley-Vulcan Mold
Co.), 237 B.R. 322, 326 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (conclusions of law by bankruptcy court reviewed by BAP
de novo); see generally 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2588 (2006).
96
It is possible that, legal standard to the contrary notwithstanding, appellate courts do not always
reexamine legal issues de novo in practice. Perhaps, for example, courts of appeals are inclined to rely upon
the expertise of BAPs (sub rosa, of course, since the law dictates otherwise) and thus are inclined to affirm
BAP opinions. Or, equally, perhaps, the appellate courts might more often than not affirm district court
opinions on the ground that district judges enjoy Article III status and thus are independent. In either case,
it would be accurate to view an appellate court affirmance as embracing the lower court opinion as correct.
97
See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); supra note 17.
98
See Nash, supra note 20, at 2197. Indeed, Professor Resnik has identified such careerism by
bankruptcy judges. See Resnik, supra note 88, at 673 (observing that “[a]n increasingly well-trodden path is
for a person to shift from magistrate or bankruptcy judge to district court judge”). A recent study of the
bankruptcy bench, however, indicated that only 8 of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench in the
decade preceding 2005 did so as a result of appointment to an Article III judgeship. Mabey, supra note 55,
at 107.
99
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 827 & n.40 and the authorities cited therein; see also Nash,
supra note 20, at 2197-98 (discussing the desire of Article III judges to avoid impeachment, public
chastisement, and overruling by the legislature).
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Even if judges on BAPs and district judges have some of these motivations,
however, that ought not to change appellate judges’ behavior in terms of upholding the
conclusion of lower court decisions, assuming at least that the reappointment or elevation
process does not demand political decisionmaking.100 Put another way, a judge—whether
a bankruptcy judge serving on a BAP or a district judge—who wants to be reappointed or
elevated has essentially the same incentive to decide cases correctly as do judges who
simply want to decide the disputes before them correctly. As such, a court reviewing a
first-level intermediate bankruptcy appellate decision—whether a panel of a court of
appeals or the Supreme Court—should adopt the conclusion of the lower court if it deems
that conclusion to be “correct.” So similarly should appellate court judges seek to affirm
correct decisions—and reverse incorrect ones—even if their motives are not strictly to
reach correct outcomes.
Based upon the foregoing, we offer the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Courts of appeals more likely will uphold the dispositions rendered by
BAPs than those rendered by district courts.
Citation rates provide yet another basis on which to test empirically the perceived
correctness of an appellate opinion.101 To the extent that citation of one court by another
reflects the view of the citing court that the other court was “correct” in some way, the
notion of correctness is, in different ways, both narrower and broader than correctness in
the context of affirmation on direct appeal: It is narrower in that the citing court well may
be citing a case not based upon a broad holding but rather based upon some narrow
holding, or even dicta; it is broader in that, unlike a court that affirms a lower court’s
disposition even though it disagrees with its reasoning, a court that cites to another
court’s decision positively at some level agrees with some aspect of the court’s
reasoning.102 Of course, there may be situations where a court cites another court’s

100

Note, however, that other motivations may explain bankruptcy judges’ behavior. See, e.g., LYNN M.
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY
COURTS (2005) (arguing that bankruptcy judges in different districts compete for large corporate
bankruptcy cases through the use of precedent favorable to corporations); Marcus Cole, ‘Delaware is not a
State’: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1890-93
(2002) (arguing that, in order to conform to dominant state culture favorable to corporations, Delaware
bankruptcy judges compete for corporate bankruptcy filings).
101
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (arguing that citation practices are not essentially a matter of taste but
rather are systematic and susceptible to empirical study); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and
1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977) [hereinafter Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations]; John Henry
Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV.
613 (1954); cf. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: Analysis
of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-76 (1998) (noting that “[c]itations are at
best a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence,” and identifying potential drawbacks and limitations
to empirical analyses of judicial citations).
102
See Landes & Posner, supra note 101, at 251 & n.3 (excluding from citation study “citations
indicating rejection of the cited case as a precedent”). Our study, too, includes only positive citations. But
cf. Landes et al., supra note 101, at 273 (deciding “not [to] distinguish between favorable, critical, or
distinguishing citations” insofar as “[c]ritical citations, in particular to opinions outside the citing circuit,
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opinion simply because it perceives the other court’s opinion to be binding precedent.103
For this reason, we consider the results of intercircuit citations and citations by courts of
appeals to BAPs and district courts—settings where there is no issue of binding precedent
such that citation is purely a matter of choice—to be especially informative.104
Within this context, one can point to two broad notions as to why courts cite other
courts’ opinions; both accord with our broad understanding of “correctness.”105 First, a
court may cite to another court’s decision because it is truly influenced by the other
court’s reasoning.106 If this is true, then the citing court in some sense finds the other
court’s reasoning to be “correct.” Alternatively (or perhaps in addition), a court may cite
to another court’s decision “not so much to explain the basis for [its] decision[] as to
justify [that] decision[], however well or ill considered they may have been,” thus making
the “primary function” of citations that of “legitimation.”107 Even if a court simply cites
to another court to legitimate its own conclusions, we would say that the citing court
perceives of the other court’s reasoning as, in some sense, “correct,” and indeed is using
the citation to bolster the perception that its own reasoning and conclusions are “correct.”
In light of the foregoing, and as detailed below, we proceed to test the perceived
correctness of an appellate opinion by considering (1) the propensity of other federal
courts within the bankruptcy judicial structure to cite the opinions issued by first-tier
appellate courts, (2) the depth of treatment given to such opinions by federal citing courts
(including direct quotation of such opinions),108 and (3) the immediacy with which such
opinions garner a citing reference. Accordingly, we offer the following additional
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2A: Federal courts more likely will positively cite to BAP opinions than to
district court opinions.
Hypothesis 2B: Federal courts will positively cite to BAP opinions more frequently than
to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 3: Courts of appeals will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to
district court opinions.
are also a gauge of influence since it is easier to ignore an unimportant decision than to spell out reasons for
not following it”).
103
See Landes & Posner, supra note 101, at 251 (excluding from citation study nonprecedential
citations).
104
See Landes & Posner, supra note 101, at 272-73; David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of
Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 337, 341
(1997).
105
See Walsh, supra note 104, at 339; see also Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, supra note
101, at 400 (offering various theories for an increase in the rate at which the California Supreme Court
cited to federal courts).
106
See Walsh, supra note 104, at 339 (“[C]itations “may” indicate intercourt communication and
influence on judicial decisionmaking.”); cf. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 651 (“The availability
of published opinions is generally thought to be an important aspect of the appellate process because
written opinions provide guidance to judges and litigants by explaining the reasons for the appellate
decision.”).
107
Walsh, supra note 104, at 339.
108
Cf. id. at 342 (distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” citations).
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Hypothesis 4: Bankruptcy courts will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to
district court opinions.
Hypothesis 5: BAPs will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to district court
opinions.
Hypothesis 6: District courts will cite more frequently to district court opinions than to
BAP opinions.
Hypothesis 7: Federal courts in other circuits will cite more frequently to BAP opinions
than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 8: Positive federal citing references will afford a greater depth of treatment
to BAP opinions than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 9A: Positive federal citing references are more likely to directly quote BAP
opinions than district court opinions.
Hypothesis 9B: Positive federal citing references will directly quote BAP opinions more
frequently than district court opinions.
Hypothesis 10: The time within which a federal citing reference will be made to opinions
issued on appeal by BAPs will more likely be faster than to those issued by district
courts.
Notably, in Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5, and 7, we hypothesize that BAP opinions will
be cited more often than district court opinions. We suggest this on the ground that
several factors weigh in favor of the conclusion that BAPs will resolve issues of
bankruptcy law “correctly,” while only one factor—the question of judicial
independence—weighs in favor of district courts.
It seems to us highly probable, a priori, that bankruptcy judges and BAPs
themselves are unlikely to be concerned with the fact that the bankruptcy judges who
serve on BAPs, like themselves, do not enjoy Article III status.109 Accordingly, we have
developed Hypotheses 4 and 5. Hypothesis 3 is to similar effect. It seems to us that
courts of appeals would be more impressed with the structural factors favoring BAPs
than the lack of Article III status—particularly with respect to subject-matter expertise.110
Note first that, to the extent that the absence of Article III status may suggest a lack of
independence vis-à-vis the issues in the case and/or the parties, that problem is greatly
ameliorated by the fact that the parties must have consented in order to have the BAP
issue a decision in the first place. Second, court of appeals judges presumably do not

109

See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 628 (“Bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) judges
provide specialized bankruptcy expertise that their bankruptcy colleagues . . . value as a source of
authority.”).
110
See id. at 678 (“Circuit judges, on average, have less specialized knowledge than bankruptcy
judges, particularly those selected to serve on BAPs.”).
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need the buffer of Article III status to remind them that they lie several notches above
bankruptcy judges and BAPs on the judicial food chain.111
The same cannot be said for district judges. The fact that district judges consider
bankruptcy judges’ lack of Article III status to be important is amply demonstrated by the
extent to which they lobbied against giving bankruptcy judges that status.112 Further,
district judges lie on the same level as BAPs on the bankruptcy appellate hierarchy.113 In
short, it seems that district judges will think of BAPs as coequals in terms of hierarchy at
best, and at worst as subordinates. Accordingly, we think it comparatively less likely that
district judges, as opposed to other federal judges, would look to opinions authored by
BAPs as opposed to district judges. It is on these bases that we preliminarily offer
Hypothesis 6.
Given our hypotheses regarding the greater propensity of other federal courts
within the bankruptcy judicial structure to cite to BAP opinions (with the exception of
Hypothesis 6), we further hypothesize that the underlying motivations prompting such
courts to engage in these citation practices will also lead them to discuss BAP opinions in
greater detail and to cite to BAP opinions with more immediacy. We thus propose
Hypotheses 9 and 10.
We now turn to evidence from the findings of our study and use that evidence to
evaluate our hypotheses empirically.

III.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW:
EVIDENCE FROM APPELLATE BANKRUPTCY OPINIONS

This Part presents the results of our empirical study of appellate bankruptcy
opinions issued both at the first-tier and second-tier levels of appellate review in the
bankruptcy judicial system. We test the hypotheses discussed above in Part II.B through
the use of quantitative methodology and look for patterns that point to a relationship
between the type of appellate court and the manner in which others perceive the quality
of review provided by the court. In doing so, we seek to evaluate the theoretical
assumptions that have evolved regarding those attributes considered to improve the
quality of appellate review. We would like to emphasize, however, that we do not purport
to provide either a definitive or exhaustive account. We readily admit that we have
chosen to study a narrow set of data from a snapshot in time and that, accordingly,
inferences should not be made regarding the representativeness of such data to the
general universe of bankruptcy appeals. Aware of these limitations, we nonetheless have
strong convictions that a great deal of valuable information can be gleaned from the data
and that this information will help guide future discussions. Ultimately, our goal is to
begin a shift away from generalization and abstraction and thereby to generate a more
111

It is also conceivable that courts of appeals in circuits that have BAPs are somewhat favorably
inclined to cite to those BAPs, to the extent that they consider the BAPs to be adjuncts of the courts of
appeals. See supra note 50.
112
See supra 37 and accompanying text.
113
See supra Fig. 1.
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concrete understanding of how differences in appellate structure affect the quality of
appellate review.
This Part proceeds as follows. Part III.A sets forth the selection criteria used to
constitute the sample for our study, discusses the major variables that we studied and
incorporated into our statistical models, and details the general characteristics of the
sample. Part III.B presents descriptive statistics comparing perceptions of the quality of
appellate review provided by BAPs with perceptions of the quality of appellate review
provided by district courts. Part III.C presents the central findings from our regression
models, and Part III.D interprets our results.
If those attributes identified as improving the quality of appellate review truly did
so, we would expect to see a positive relationship between BAP opinions and their
perceived quality. Furthermore, we would expect this relationship to be stronger than the
relationship, if any, between district court opinions and their perceived quality.
In summary, we find somewhat mixed results. On the one hand, the manner in
which courts of appeals dispose of appeals from BAPs and district courts provides some
evidence for the claim that BAPs would be perceived to provide a better quality of review
than the district courts. On the other hand, data on subsequent citation by federal courts to
the opinions rendered on appeal by BAPs and district courts lend considerable support to
the claim. Given the possible impact of selection effects on the affirmance data as
opposed to the citation data, we consider the strongly robust results we observe in the
citation context to be more informative.
A.

Sample Selection and Variables of Interest

1.

Sample Selection

To constitute the sample of appellate bankruptcy opinions for this study, we
formulated a search query in Westlaw’s FBKR-CS database, which contains reported and
unreported case law documents (i.e., decisions and orders) relating to bankruptcy that
were issued by various courts—including the Supreme Court, courts of appeals,
bankruptcy appellate panels, district courts, and bankruptcy courts.114 Since we sought to
create two separate databases, one for first-tier appellate dispositions by BAPs and
district courts (the “first-tier database”) and one for second-tier appellate dispositions by
courts of appeals (the “second-tier database”), we ran two, separate search queries. The
first query consisted of the single term “11 U.S.C.,” the standard citation to title 11 of the
United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code”), coupled with (1) a
date restriction that limited query retrieval to decisions and orders issued during the
three-year period beginning on October 1, 1997 and ending on September 30, 2000,115
and (2) a field restriction that limited query retrieval to decisions and orders whose
preliminary field contained either the term “district court” or “bankruptcy appellate
panel,” but not “court of appeals.”116 The second query mirrored the first query with the
114

Reported case law documents are those released for publication in West Federal Reporters.
Coverage for the FBKR-CS database begins with the year 1789.
116
The preliminary field for case law documents (i.e., decisions or orders issued by a court) in
Westlaw is found at the top of such documents and generally contains the name of the court that issued the
115
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exception that field restriction limited query retrieval to decisions and orders whose
preliminary field only contained the term “court of appeals.”117 The first query produced
1,487 documents, while the second query produced 871 documents. These large numbers
clearly presented a challenge by virtue of the time it would take to review each document.
We sought to reduce the time demand by randomly selecting for review approximately
one-quarter of the documents produced by each search query—specifically, 372
documents from the first search query and 218 documents from the second search
query.118 We then began our review of each of these documents according to the
following procedures in order to identify those that would be selected for inclusion and
analysis in the two databases.
We sought to include in the databases appeals that involved the resolution of
dispositions rendered by bankruptcy courts in core proceedings.119 We included only
those documents that disposed of the appeal on the merits. (As most of these documents
were opinions rather than orders, for ease of reference we will collectively refer to the
documents as opinions for the remainder of the Article.) Opinions that solely involved
procedural dispositions (e.g., dismissal for lack of jurisdiction) were excluded. In most
instances, each opinion generated one observation. However, some opinions generated
multiple observations. For example, some opinions resolved multiple appeals in separate
and unrelated bankruptcy cases. In other instances, an opinion would resolve an appeal of
separate orders that were entered by the bankruptcy court in distinct proceedings within
the same case. Finally, by virtue of the identical date restriction included in both search
queries, each opinion was issued during one of three government fiscal years: either
1998, 1999, or 2000.120
document. In its entirety, the first search query read as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr (“district court”
“bankruptcy appellate panel” % “court of appeals”) & da (aft 9/30/1997 & bef 10/01/2000).
117
In its entirety, the first search query read as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr (“court of appeals”) & da (aft
9/30/1997 & bef 10/01/2000).
118
Each search query produced a numbered result list in which the opinions were listed in reverse
chronological order. For the first-tier database, the results were organized by court in reverse chronological
order (i.e., district court opinions were listed first in reverse chronological order followed by BAP opinions
listed in reverse chronological order). We used a random number generator to select the opinions from each
result list that we would analyze. For each result list, we randomly generated a set of unique numbers
falling within the range of the total documents retrieved by the search query.
119
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
120
We tailored our search in this manner for two reasons. First, we wanted to facilitate comparisons of
our data with official government data regarding bankruptcy appeals. Generally, such data track the
government’s fiscal year, which begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th, rather than the
calendar year.
Second, we chose the specific time period for this study in order to capture the BAP experience at its
apex in terms of participating circuits. BAPs did not become a fixture of the bankruptcy judicial system
until 1996. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 amended the Judicial Code to permit, but not
require, the establishment of BAPs on a circuit-by-circuit basis. Only the First and Ninth Circuits chose to
do so, establishing their BAPs in 1979 and 1980, respectively. In the wake of the Marathon decision,
however, the First Circuit concluded that continued operation of a BAP would be inappropriate until
Congress remedied the defects in the constitutionally infirm, bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme. See
Commonwealth v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion in Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1984), holding
that circuit court supervision of the BAP satisfied Marathon’s requirement of Article III judicial review.
Despite the measures taken by Congress in 1984 through the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
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Pursuant to these selection procedures, our first-tier database consists of 268
observations drawn from 264 opinions,121 four of which produced a second observation.
Our second-tier database consists of 170 observations drawn from 165 opinions,122 five
of which produced a second observation. Not surprisingly, for both databases, the
majority of appeals wended their way through the district courts rather than the BAPs—
although more so for appeals in the second-tier database (approximately 81%) than the
first-tier database (approximately 60%). The distributions of opinions by circuit in each
database roughly approximate one another.123
As stated before, we do not seek in our study to make claims about the
unobserved population of bankruptcy appeals but rather confine our commentary to the
observed sample of data we have amassed. That said, we recognize that the story we seek
to tell may not be as compelling if selection bias accounts for the results that we present.
Accordingly, we seek to alleviate concerns regarding two major types of potential
selection bias stemming from litigant choices that could produce a distorted picture: (1)
case-selection bias and (2) forum-selection bias.
It has been theorized that cases adjudicated at the trial level represent a
nonrandom group by virtue of litigant choices.124 For a host of reasons, litigants may
choose only a select group of cases for which to pursue a final adjudication by a trial
court. If tried cases substantively differ from settled cases, a study that focuses solely
only tried cases will misrepresent the larger world of litigation since most cases settle.125
An appeal further exacerbates the bias produced by the selection of cases for litigation
since (1) not all adjudicated cases are appealed and (2) not all appealed cases are
disposed of by court decision. The bankruptcy appellate structure doubly compounds the
problem given the two levels of intermediate appellate review.

Judgeship Act to address the Marathon decision, the First Circuit Judicial Council chose not to reauthorize
its BAP, thus leaving the Ninth Circuit as the only circuit with an operating BAP. This state of affairs
changed with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which amended the Judicial Code to require the judicial
council of each circuit to create a BAP absent a finding by the council that (1) insufficient judicial
resources in the circuit would preclude its establishment, or (2) that establishment of a BAP would produce
undue delay or increased cost to parties in bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. § 158. Prompted into action by this
amendment, in 1996 the First Circuit reauthorized and the Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
established BAPs. The Second Circuit BAP, however, ceased operations on July 1, 2000.
121
Thus, our selection criteria reduced the random sample of documents relating to the first-tier
database by approximately 18%.
122
Similar to the first-tier database, see supra note 121, our selection criteria reduced the random
sample of documents relating to the second-tier database by approximately 17%.
123
See infra Appendix tbl.1.
124
See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).
125
According to a recent empirical study, approximately 2% of federal civil lawsuits in 2002 ended in
trial. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 tbl.1 (2004). The bankruptcy analogue of a federal
civil law suit is an adversary proceeding. See supra note 45. In 2002, approximately 5% of adversary
proceedings terminated during or after trial. See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of
American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 915, 930 (2005).
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If these assumptions are correct, should they be of concern in a study such as
ours? We think not for the following reasons. First, cases settled either at the trial or at
the appellate level are not a relevant population for purposes of our study. Our study asks
whether the circuit court will perceive the BAP to have performed the appellate function
better than the district court. Since circuit courts are not autonomous decision-making
bodies and can only resolve those appeals brought before them by the litigants, the only
cases that can and should be measured for this purpose are those cases actually appealed
to and resolved by the circuit courts.126 Second, Professor Frank Cross’s comprehensive
empirical study of decisionmaking by the courts of appeals has documented that litigant
effects are not a major determinant of circuit court decisions, both generally and in
particular types of cases (i.e., criminal decisions and labor decisions).127 We have no
reason to believe that circuit court outcomes in bankruptcy decisions would be any
different. Finally, case-selection bias should not impact our citation data insofar as a
court is generally constrained to written opinions when it chooses those opinions to
which it cites.
We also recognize that our data potentially include a forum-selection bias in that
attorneys in circuits that have BAPs may be more likely to prefer appeals relating to
certain subject matters to be heard by BAPs than by district courts, or vice versa.128 Thus,
it is possible that there are some issues that BAPs never or only rarely hear. (Assuming
that bankruptcy cases are at some level homogenous nationwide, that will not be the case
for district courts, since there are circuits in which district courts hear substantially all
appeals from bankruptcy court rulings.) More generally, it is possible that BAP and
district court dockets vary substantially. While we cannot eliminate this possibility, we
have looked for evidence of such a bias and have found no such evidence.129 Thus, while
126

Even if the group of appeals resolved by the circuit courts are nonrandom such that our results
would not hold if the circuit courts also decided those cases that were not appealed beyond the first level of
intermediate review, such theorizing is an exercise in futility. Simply put, we cannot measure the outcome
of circuit court decisions that do not exist. In other words, since we look to measure quality of appellate
review that the circuit court perceives, we ought not to fret about those cases that will never see light of day
in the circuit court.
127
See CROSS, supra note 92, at 123-47.
128
Since the Judicial Code mandates that, in circuits with BAPs, bankruptcy appeals will be heard by
the BAP unless one of the parties to the appeal elects to have the district court hear the appeal, see 28
U.S.C. § 158(c)(1), the dynamic of any potential selection bias at work in the BAP perhaps should be
understood as the product of those subset of appeals where the forum preferences of the parties to the
appeal have aligned. Although there could be instances where all parties prefer to have the appeal heard by
the district court, there would also be instances where only one party had such a preference. Thus, a BAP
docket is unique in that all of its appeals theoretically involve litigants with a consistent forum preference.
We say “theoretically” since it is conceivable that a party with an inconsistent forum preference may have
failed to make, in a timely fashion, the election for the district court to hear the appeal.
129
By virtue of the fact that, for purposes of our statistical analyses, we do not differentiate between
district courts from circuits with BAPs (BAP circuits) and those from circuits without BAPs (non-BAP
circuits), the concern arises that any potential selection bias at work in BAP circuits could be masked by
those observations from non-BAP circuits. Approximately 31% of the observations in the first-tier database
and 36% of the observations in the second-tier database consisted of district court opinions from non-BAP
circuits. See infra Appendix tbl.1. We conducted bivariate statistical analyses to ascertain whether selection
bias existed in the BAP circuits by focusing on those circumstances in which one would expect to see such
bias have a disproportionate effect—namely, (1) the subject matter of the appeal and (2) affirmance rates
by the court of appeals. For neither of these circumstances do we find evidence of selection bias.
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recognizing that such a bias may lurk at more refined levels of case-type delineation, we
are at least confident that the size of any forum-selection bias is confined, not pernicious,
and thus probably has not had a meaningful effect upon our data and analysis.130
2.

Variables of Interest

Recall that we sought to test our broad inquiry into the perceived quality of
appellate review by focusing on (1) how two distinct appellate courts in the bankruptcy
judicial system—the BAPs and district courts—perform their error-finding function and
(2) how other judicial actors perceive the quality of that performance. As our hypotheses
indicate, we concerned ourselves with an array of dependent variables that fall within one
of two categories: (1) the disposition rendered on appeal by the court of appeals and (2)
First, we examined whether a statistically significant relationship exists in BAP circuits between the
subject matter of the appeal and the first-tier appellate court to hear the appeal. To do so, we classified
observations according to whether the subject of the appeal fell into one of the four most frequently
occurring subjects of appeal heard by first-tier appellate courts. For the first-tier database, for all
observations and for those observations from BAP circuits, the four most frequently occurring subjects
were matters relating to discharge, procedure/jurisdiction, avoiding powers, and multiple subjects. For the
second-tier database, for all observations and for those observations from BAP circuits, the four most
frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge, claims, avoiding powers, and multiple
subjects. For the first-tier database, approximately 56% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP
circuits as well as all district courts combined involve one of the four most frequently occurring subjects.
For the second-tier database, approximately 64% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP circuits and
59% of the appeals heard by all district courts combined involve one of the four most frequently occurring
subjects. Applying a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, we note that no statistically significant
relationship exists in BAP circuits between the subject matter of the appeal and the first-tier appellate court
to hear the appeal (a p-value of 0.288 for the first tier database and a p-value of 0.876 for the second-tier
database).
Second, for all observations in the first-tier database, we further examine whether a statistically
significant relationship exists between the subject matter of the appeal and whether there was a subsequent
appeal to the circuit court. Again, we classify observations according to whether the subject of the appeal
fell into one of the four most frequently occurring subject matter categories. For those observations
involving subsequent appeal to the circuit court, approximately 62% involved a top subject matter category.
For those observations without circuit court review, approximately 56% involved a top subject matter
category. Applying a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, we note that no statistically significant
relationship exists (p = 0.475) between the subject matter of the appeal and subsequent appeal to the circuit
court.
We finally note that, for both databases, courts of appeals affirm district courts in BAP circuits at a
similar rate to the affirmance rate for all district courts combined. For the first-tier database, courts of
appeals affirm district courts in BAP circuits 62% of the time and affirm all district courts combined
approximately 61% of the time; for the second-tier database, courts of appeals affirm district courts in BAP
circuits 68% of the time and affirm all district courts combined approximately 70% of the time. Bivariate
analysis confirms that no statistically significant difference exists between the rate at which courts of
appeals affirm district courts from BAP circuits and district courts from non-BAP circuits. For the first-tier
database, a two-sided Fisher test indicates a p-value of 0.526; and for the second-tier database, a two-sided
Fisher test indicates a p-value of 0.327.
130
With respect to citations, if there is a forum-selection bias, then the BAPs are not deciding some
categories of cases—and, perhaps, certain issues—that the district courts are. This logically should translate
into an increase in citations to district court opinions as compared to BAP opinions, since other courts
facing such issues and wishing to include citations will have no opportunity to cite to any BAP opinions.
Yet, as we discuss below, our results on the data as they are generally show that BAP citations are favored.
In short, if there is a selection bias, then our statistical analyses, if anything, understate the extent to which
BAP citations are favored.
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citations by other federal courts to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district
courts. We will discuss each category and the variables associated with it in turn.
First, we define the disposition rendered on appeal according to three ordered
outcomes: (1) “negative” for those dispositions where the reviewing court reversed,
remanded or vacated the disposition rendered below, (2) “hybrid” for those dispositions
where the reviewing court affirmed in part the disposition rendered below, and
(3) “positive” for those dispositions where the reviewing court fully affirmed the
disposition rendered below.131 Second, in order to document citation data to the opinions
in our databases, we relied upon KeyCite, West’s citation research service.132 We
documented for each first-tier level opinion all positive citations made to it by any federal
court—aside from those citations made in connection with the direct appellate history of
the opinion—during the five-year period following the date that the opinion was issued.
Pursuant to these criteria, approximately three-quarters (75%) of the first-tier appellate
opinions had citing references. We further documented (1) citations by type of court, (2)
citations by depth of treatment, (3) citations directly quoting the cited opinion, and (4) the
immediacy with which first-tier appellate opinions were cited.133
The major explanatory variables (i.e., independent variables) in the databases
include (1) whether the BAP or district court heard the initial appeal, (2) whether the
appellant was solely the debtor in whose case the appeal arose, (3) whether the appellee
was solely the debtor in whose case the appeal arose, (4) whether the appeal arose in the
context of a case filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, (5) whether the
bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was filed by an individual or a business entity,
(6) the type of dispute proceeding within which the appeal arose (i.e., an adversary
proceeding or contested matter), and (7) the broad subject matter of the appeal.
B.

Bivariate Descriptive Statistics

Our primary interest lies in the statistical relationship between the identity of the
first-tier appellate court and various dependent variables: (1) the disposition rendered
upon subsequent appeal by the court of appeals, (2) the number of federal court citations
to the opinion issued by the first-tier appellate court, (3) the depth of treatment given to
first-tier appellate opinions when cited by other federal courts, (4) direct quotation of the
first-tier appellate opinion by positive citing references, and (5) the immediacy with
131

For the frequency of the dispositions rendered on appeal in first-tier and second-tier level opinions,
see infra Appendix tbl.2.
132
KeyCite organizes citing references for a case by segregating negative citing references from
positive citing references. KeyCite further organizes negative and positive citing references according to
the depth of treatment given by the citing reference to the cited opinion. Four categories exist for the depth
of treatment provided by the citing reference: (1) “examined,” indicating that the citing reference contains
an extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text; (2) “discussed,”
indicating that the citing reference contains a substantial discussion of the cited opinion, usually more than
a paragraph but less than a printed page; (3) “cited,” indicating that the citing reference contains some
discussion of the cited opinion, usually less than a paragraph; and (4) “mentioned,” indicating that the
citing reference contains a brief reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string citation. Finally, KeyCite
identifies citing references that directly quote the cited opinion.
133
For citation data for those first-tier appellate opinions with positive citing references, see infra
Appendix tbl.3.
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which the first-tier appellate opinion is cited. By searching for a statistically significant
relationship between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and each of these
dependent variables, we can look for those relationships warranting further inquiry
through regression analysis that will confirm the existence of the relationship when
controlling for other factors.
Hypothesis 1 posits that courts of appeals more likely will uphold the dispositions
rendered on appeal by BAPs than those rendered by district courts. Our data offer limited
support for this hypothesis. Although we find that a statistically significant relationship
exists between the first-tier appellate court and the subsequent disposition rendered on
appeal for the 77 observations in the first-tier database for which there was a subsequent
appeal to the court of appeals,134 we do not find such a relationship for the 170
observations in the second-tier database With respect to the former sample, the court of
appeals fully affirmed the disposition rendered by the BAP approximately 81% of the
time as opposed to 62% for district court dispositions.135 If no association had existed
between the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially decided the appeal and the
disposition rendered on subsequent appeal by the court of appeals, we would have
expected to see BAP dispositions fully affirmed by the court of appeals approximately
69% of the time. Our analysis confirms that there is less than a 5% probability that
random chance alone would have yielded a difference as large as the one witnessed. For
this limited subset of data, then, we might infer that the identity of the first-tier appellate
court caused at least some of the observed difference in the rate at which the court of
appeals upheld the first-tier disposition.
On the other hand, with respect to the 170 observations in the second-tier
database, the court of appeals fully affirmed BAP dispositions approximately 82% of the
time as opposed to approximately 68% of the time for district court dispositions.136 We
would have expected to see BAP dispositions in the second-tier database fully affirmed
approximately 71% of the in the absence of a relationship between the type of first-tier
appellate court to have initially decided the appeal and the subsequent disposition by the
court of appeals. Our analysis reveals that there is a 9.2% probability that random chance
134

Of the 77 observations in the first-tier database for which there was a subsequent appeal to the court
of appeals, 50 were district court dispositions and 27 were BAP dispositions. As there were a total of 162
district court and 106 BAP dispositions in the first-tier database, see infra Appendix tbl.1, approximately
31% of the district court dispositions and 25% of the BAP dispositions involved subsequent appeal. As our
first-tier database only includes opinions that disposed of the appeal on the merits, these figures seem to be
consistent with empirical evidence that has estimated that up to a third of first-tier appellate dispositions
rendered on the merits have been further appealed to the court of appeals. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra
note 62, at 630; see also U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, STATISTICAL
REPORT: JANUARY 1, 2005 – DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2005) (documenting that approximately 30% of
bankruptcy appeals in the 8th Circuit in 2005 were taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals).
135
The 81% affirmance rate for BAP dispositions in the first-tier database approximates the rate at
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed merit-based BAP dispositions—that is,
89%—during the ten-year period beginning on July 1, 1996 and ending on June 30, 2006. See U.S.
BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, ANNUAL REPORT OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS IN
PARTICIPATING BAP DISTRICTS FOR THE STATISTICAL YEAR JULY 1, 2005 – JUNE 30, 2006 (INCLUDING
DISPOSITION STATISTICS FOR APPEALS DISPOSED OF SINCE JULY 1, 1996) 8 (2005).
136
The 82% affirmance rate for BAP dispositions in the second-tier database approximates the
experience in the Tenth Circuit from 1996 to 2006. See supra note 135.
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alone would have yielded the difference witnessed in the second-tier database between
the observed and expected outcomes. Because there exists a greater than 5% probability
that this difference is completely random, for purposes of the second-tier database, we
cannot formally reject the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between the type of
first-tier appellate court and the subsequent disposition by the court of appeals.
Nonetheless, this finding should be placed in proper perspective. First, our failure to
unearth evidence of a statistically significant difference in this particular instance does
not mean that the difference does not exist. Moreover, a 9.2% probability is still fairly
small—enough so that we ought not to discount completely the support we find in the
first-tier database for Hypothesis 1.137 Finally, it may be the case that we observe this
degree of possible random difference due to the small frequency of BAP dispositions in
the second-tier database—to wit, approximately 19% of the dispositions.138
Hypotheses 2 through 7 generally predict that, with the exception of district
courts, other federal courts will positively cite to BAP opinions more than they positively
cite to district court opinions. For district courts, we hypothesize that they will cite more
often to district court opinions than BAP opinions. Finally, we predict that intercircuit
citations to BAP opinions will exceed intercircuit citations to district court opinions. As
an initial matter, BAP opinions had a higher propensity to be positively cited by other
federal courts than district court opinions. Approximately 91% of the BAP opinions in
the first-tier database had been positively cited by federal courts, whereas slightly less
than two-thirds (65%) of the district court opinions had received similar treatment. In the
absence of a relationship between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and positive
citation thereto by other federal courts, we would have expected to see approximately
three-quarters (75%) of the BAP opinions positively cited. Our analysis confirms that
there is less than a 0.01% probability that random chance alone would have yielded a
difference as large as the one witnessed. It would thus appear that the type of first-tier
appellate opinion has some influence on a federal court’s decision to cite that opinion.
We can further elaborate on this relationship by looking to the number of citing
references to the opinions according to the type of federal court making the citing
reference. We note that 53% of the observations in the first-tier database that have
positive citing references are district court opinions.139 Assuming a random (or at least)
random distribution of issues and factual settings, we would expect citation rates to
137

For the details of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.4.
See infra Appendix tbl.1 (indicating that 33 of 200 opinions in the second-tier database consist of
BAP opinions).
139
The first-tier database contained 202 observations in which a federal court positively cited to the
opinion issued by the first-tier appellate court. In conducting our bivariate analyses, we exclude extreme
outliers (i.e., those observations involving extreme values in the tails of the distribution of the positive
citing reference data). We define an extreme outlier to be any observation with a total number of positive
citations that falls above the third quartile of the positive citing reference data (7 citations) by more than 3
times the interquartile range for such data (5 citations). See infra Appendix tbl.3 (describing distribution of
positive citing references to first-tier opinions). Accordingly, we excluded any observations with more than
22 positive citing references. Pursuant to this measure, we eliminated 2 observations from our analysis—
leaving us with a total of 200 observations for analysis. Accordingly, approximately 99% of the first-tier
appellate opinions in our sample that were cited positively by other federal courts are included in our
bivariate analyses of the citing reference data.
138
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slightly favor district court opinions.140 Our data, however, generally show that citation
rates favor BAP opinions. Specifically, we find strong differences between the BAP and
district court samples that are statistically significant at both the mean and the median.
For example, a BAP opinion that was positively cited had, on average, approximately 7
citations by other federal courts, whereas its district court counterpart averaged
approximately 3 citations. Furthermore, by disaggregating our citation data according to
the type of federal court that cited the first-tier appellate opinion, we see that the BAP
opinions in our study had a statistically significantly greater number of citing references
by courts of appeals, BAPs, bankruptcy courts than did district court opinions. On the
other hand, district court opinions had a statistically significantly greater number of citing
references by other district courts than did BAP opinions. Finally, the data evidence that
federal courts in other circuits cited more to BAP opinions than to district court opinions
and that the difference is statistically significant. Some of these results are illustrated
below in Figure 2.141
FIGURE 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY CITING REFERENCE TYPE
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Cf. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, supra note 101, at 403 (arguing that the larger
number of citations by the California Supreme Court to opinions issued by the courts of New York State
may be due to the large case literature arising out of New York).
141
For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
36

Additional evidence of the perceived correctness of the first-tier appellate
opinions can be gleaned from examining the depth of treatment provided to those
opinions by the federal courts that cited to them. Hypothesis 8 predicts that the citing
references to BAP opinions will have afforded a greater depth of treatment than district
court opinions. Our data generally support this hypothesis. We find that, at both the
median and the mean, BAP opinions had a statistically significant higher number of
citing references by other federal courts that cited (i.e., provided discussion of less than a
paragraph) and discussed (i.e., provided discussion of more than a paragraph but less than
a printed page) the opinion.142 We also find that, at the median (but not the mean), BAP
opinions had a statistically significant higher number of citing references by other federal
courts that mentioned the opinion (i.e., contained a brief reference to the cited opinion,
usually in a string citation). We do not find, however, either at the median or the mean,
any association between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and the number of positive
citing references that examine the opinion (i.e., contain an extended discussion of the
cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text). Figure 3 illustrates some of these
results.143
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY DEPTH OF TREATMENT
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For purposes of this analysis, we once again exclude extreme outliers according to the criteria
discussed in supra note 139.
143
For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
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We tracked the number of citing references that directly quoted the first-tier
appellate opinion as yet another metric for evaluating the perceived correctness of the
first-tier appellate opinions in our study. First, we find evidence to support our hypothesis
that a greater likelihood exists that positive federal citing references will have quoted
BAP opinions as opposed to district court opinions. Approximately 65% of the federal
courts that positively cited BAP opinions also directly quoted those opinions, whereas
only 38% of district court opinions with positive federal citing references were directly
quoted. If no relationship existed between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and
positive direct quotation thereto by other federal courts, we would have expected to see
slightly more than half (51%) of the BAP opinions to have been directly quoted. Our
analysis confirms that there is less than a 0.01% probability that random chance alone
would have yielded a difference as large as this, thus suggesting that the type of first-tier
appellate opinion partly influences a federal court’s decision to quote the opinion directly
when positively citing to it. Furthermore, we observe that, on average, approximately 1.5
of the positive citing references to BAP opinions directly quote such opinions as opposed
to only 0.58 of the positive citing references to district court opinions. Also, whereas 65%
of the positively cited BAP opinions have at least one directly quoting citing reference,
only 39% of the positively cited district court opinions did so. These differences are
highly statistically significant and further support our contention that positive federal
citing references will have directly quoted BAP opinions more frequently than district
court opinions.144
Finally, it strikes us that the immediacy with which a federal court cites to such an
opinion can serve as yet another indicator of its perceived quality. Accordingly, we
consider the period of time for which it took a first-tier appellate opinion to be positively
cited by a federal court.145 Our data show that, for the group of positively cited first-tier
appellate opinions, a BAP opinion would receive its first positive citing reference by
another federal court, on average, in approximately 10 months’ time (306 days), whereas
it took nearly twice as long—approximately 17 months’ time (530 days)—for a district
court opinion. Moreover, slightly more than half (51%) of the BAP opinions from this
group received their first positive citation within approximately a 6-month period. This
starkly contrasts with district court opinions, only nearly a quarter (24%) of which
received their first positive citation within the same period of time. We infer from these
highly statistically significant differences that the type of first-tier appellate opinion has
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For purposes of this analyses, we excluded extreme outliers according to the criteria discussed in
supra note 139. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
145
We might assume that an opinion that comprehensively and effectively addresses an unresolved or
debated issue of law that has repeated occasion to be litigated not only will be heavily cited, but that such
an opinion will also have the tendency to be cited more quickly. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we
exclude the extreme outliers we identified with respect to total number of positive citing references. See
supra note 139. We further sought to identify whether there were any extreme outliers in terms of the
number of days it took for the first-tier appellate opinions to be cited. In this instance, we define an extreme
outlier to be any observation with a total number of days that falls above the third quartile of the immediacy
data (638 days) by more than 3 times the interquartile range for such data (520.5 days). On the basis of
these parameters, there were no additional extreme outliers to be excluded.
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some association with the time within which the opinion will garner its first positive
citation by another federal court.146
In summary, based on the dispositions rendered by courts of appeals on
subsequent review of BAP and district court opinions, we find limited evidence that
courts of appeals perceive BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate review than
district courts. On the other hand, based on citations to the opinions issued by BAPs and
district courts, we find strong evidence that most nonreviewing federal courts perceive
the quality of BAP opinions to be better. We now look to confirm whether these
associations will persist and, if so, the strength of such associations when controlling for
other potential explanatory variables.
C.

Regression Analyses

Here, we seek to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the perceived quality
of appellate review by constructing a series of regression models that will test whether
the statistically significant relationships we identified in Part III.B persist when
controlling for the independent variables discussed in Part III.A.
1.

Subsequent Disposition by Court of Appeals

For the 77 observations in the first-tier database that involved subsequent appeal
to the court of appeals, we use an ordinal logistic regression model to predict the
disposition rendered by the court of appeals (with negative coded as 0, hybrid coded as 1,
and positive coded as 2) based on the following independent variables:
•

whether the first-tier appellate court was a district court (coded 0) or a BAP
(coded 1) (Court);

•

whether the appeal arose within the context of an adversary proceeding (coded 0)
or contested matter (coded 1) (Dispute Type);

•

the fiscal year in which the first-tier appellate court issued its opinion (for which
we created three dichotomous variables with the response categories 0 for those
opinions issued outside the fiscal year in question and 1 for those opinions issued
during the fiscal year in question) (Fiscal Year);147

•

whether the first-tier appellate court had published its disposition (Published);

•

whether the only party to appeal to the first-tier level court was the debtor
(Appellant);

•

whether the debtor was the only party appearing as an appellee at the first-tier
level of review (Appellee);

•

whether the appeal arose in the context of a Chapter 7 case (Chapter 7),

146

For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
The opinions in the database were issued during one of three government fiscal years—1998, 1999
or 2000. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
147
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•

whether the bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was that of an individual
(coded 0) or business entity (coded 1) (Debtor Type); and

•

whether the subject of the appeal could be classified as falling into one of the four
most frequently occurring subjects of appeal heard by first-tier appellate courts
for which there was subsequent appeal to the court of appeals (Subject).148

According to the model, even when controlling for other potential explanatory variables,
the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially determined the appeal remains a
statistically significant predictor of the subsequent disposition rendered by the court of
appeals.149 To further elaborate, using the actual values for all of the independent
variables included in the model, we can calculate the predicted probability of affirmance
by the court of appeals for each of the 77 first-tier appellate dispositions upon which the
model is based. In Figure 4 below, we present the predicted probabilities for affirmance
of the actual observations in our regression model through use of a histogram that
displays the distribution of those probabilities for district court dispositions and BAP
dispositions separately. The width of each bar represents a specific interval of predicted
probability of affirmance, and the height of each bar represents the percentage of
dispositions that fall within that interval. A comparison of the two distributions reveals
some interesting figures.

148

For the 77 observations in the first-tier database involving subsequent appeal to the court of appeals,
the four most frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge (23%), procedure/jurisdiction
(14%), multiple subjects (14%), and avoiding powers (10%). For the variables Published, Appellant,
Appellee, Chapter 7, and Subject, we coded negative responses as 0 and positive responses as 1.
149
Both the Court and Chapter 7 variables are significant predictors of the disposition rendered on
subsequent appeal from the first-tier appellate court to the court of appeals, while the other variables have
no association with a court of appeals’ disposition. For detailed results from the regression model, see infra
Appendix tbl.6.
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FIGURE 4
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR AFFIRMANCE OF
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE DISPOSITIONS BY COURTS OF APPEALS
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First, we find for this limited subset of data that, on average, a BAP disposition
had an 83% chance of being affirmed by the court of appeals in contrast to 61% for
district court dispositions. Put another way, the likelihood of affirmance by the court of
appeals increased by 36% when it reviewed BAP dispositions. Second, while
approximately 52% of the BAP disposition had a 90% or greater predicted probability of
affirmance, only 4% of the district court dispositions did so. Perhaps even more striking,
no BAP disposition had less than a 50% predicted probability of affirmance whereas
slightly more than one-quarter (28%) of district court dispositions did. These findings
support our hypothesis that courts of appeals will more likely uphold the dispositions
rendered by BAPs than those rendered by district courts. As this model is limited to a
narrow subset of our data, and since our bivariate analyses in Part III.B of observations
from the second-tier database suggested that no statistically significant relationship
existed between the type of first-tier appellate court and the subsequent disposition
rendered by the court of appeals, we are cautious about reading too much into these
numbers. We would emphasize, however that, although we cannot say that we have
statistically significant evidence in the second-tier database that the type of first-tier
appellate court influences subsequent disposition by the court of appeals, the absence of
such evidence does not mean that such an association does not exist. And, in fact, we
have found evidence of such an association in the first-tier database. It would be
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inappropriate, in our view, to interpret the lack of evidence in the second-tier database to
negate the evidence unearthed in the first-tier database.
2.

Positive Citing References by Other Federal Courts

To further explore (1) the decision of federal courts to cite positively to the
opinions issued by first tier appellate courts, (2) the extent to which they do so, (3) the
manner in which they do so, and (4) the immediacy with whey they do so, we construct a
series of binary logistic regression models and multiple linear regression models. First,
we examine whether the association between the identity of the first-tier appellate court
and positive citation to its opinion persists when controlling for other factors. For all 286
observations in the first-tier database, we use a binary logistic regression model to predict
whether a federal court will have cited positively to the first tier appellate opinion (coding
opinions with no positive citations as 0 and coding opinions with at least one positive
citation as 1) based on the following independent variables: (1) Court; (2) whether the
first-tier appellate court determined that error had occurred in the disposition rendered by
the bankruptcy court, with “error” coded as 1 and “no error” coded as 2 (Disposition—
Narrowly Defined);150 (3) Published; (4) Appellant; (5) Appellee; (6) Chapter 7; (7)
Debtor Type; (8) Dispute Type, (9) Subject; (10) whether the first-tier court’s disposition
was subsequently appealed to the court of appeals (Subsequent Appeal); and (11) Fiscal
Year.
The model identifies the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially
determined the appeal as a statistically significant predictor of whether the court’s
opinion will have been positively cited by another federal court.151 Figure 5 below
illustrates the predicted probability of positive citation to the first-tier appellate opinion
based on the actual values for all of the independent variables included in the model.

150

By coding the disposition of the first-tier appellate court in this manner, this had the effect of
collapsing the first two outcomes (i.e., “negative” and “hybrid”) in our ordinally defined version of the
variable into the category of “error” since a partial affirmance also entails a conclusion that some error
occurred below.
151
For detailed results from the regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.7.
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FIGURE 5
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR POSITIVE CITATION OF
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS
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On average, a BAP opinion had approximately a 90.6% chance of being positively cited
by another federal court whereas a district court had a 65.4% chance. Accordingly, the
likelihood of positive citation to a first-tier appellate opinion by another federal court
increased by approximately 38.5% for BAP opinions. Furthermore, approximately 80%
of the BAP opinions, as opposed to only 7% of the district court opinions, had a 90% or
greater predicted probability of being positively cited by another federal court. Finally,
nearly a third (32%) of the district court opinions had less than a 50% predicted
probability of being positively cited. In stark contrast, only 1% of BAP opinions did so.
These data support our hypothesis that, if a BAP issued the first-tier appellate opinion, it
will increase the chances of the opinion being positively cited by other federal courts.152
The question arises whether this association persists when analyzing the extent to
which other federal courts cite to first-tier appellate opinions, whether analyzing citations
in the aggregate (i.e., total number of positive citations) or disaggregated according to the
type of citing federal court. To answer the question, we implement a variety of regression
models that analyze the 200 observations in the first-tier database where a federal court

152

The model also identifies the Published, Dispute and Subject variables as significant predictors of
whether the first-tier appellate opinion will have been cited by other federal courts.
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positively cited to the opinion issued by the BAP or district court.153 First, in order to
predict the aggregate number of positive citations, we conduct a zero-truncated negative
binomial regression analysis.154 We then proceed to analyze the number of positive
citations by citing court type pursuant to a negative binomial regression model.155 For
both of these models, we incorporate the same independent variables from the binary
logistic regression analysis conducted to predict whether the first-tier appellate opinion
would be cited.
The models indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists between the
type of first-tier appellate court that issued the opinion and the total number of positive
citing references as well as positive citing references by bankruptcy courts, BAPs, district
courts, courts of appeals, and federal courts from other circuits. With all variables held
constant at their mean, BAP opinions were predicted to receive over a five-year period
approximately 3.7 more positive citations than district court opinions. Focusing on the
type of citing federal court, BAP opinions were predicted to receive approximately (1) 2
more bankruptcy court citations, (2) 1.3 more BAP citations, (3) 0.2 more court of
appeals citations, and (4) 0.64 more citations by federal courts from other circuits. These
results support Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5 and 7. We also found that district court opinions
were predicted to receive approximately 0.34 more district court citations than BAP
opinions, thus confirming the distinction we drew in Hypothesis 6.156 Overall, the bulk of
our evidence suggests that other actors within the bankruptcy judicial system perceived
BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate review than district courts.157
Using the same negative binomial regression model we used to predict the extent
to which federal courts would cite to the first-tier appellate opinions, we find limited
results for whether the type of first-tier appellate opinion will be a statistically significant
predictor of the depth of treatment provided to the opinion by the citing federal court
when controlling for other factors.158 Again, when holding all other variables constant at
153

There were actually 202 such observations. For purposes of our regression analyses, however, we
eliminated 2 extreme outliers, which left 200 observations to be analyzed. See supra note 139.
154
A negative binomial regression model is appropriate here since (1) the aggregate number of positive
citations is a count variable that is overdispersed and (2) there are no zero values for this subset of
observations (i.e., all opinions have at least one positive citing reference).
155
We run the regression model five times to account for the five different types of citing federal
courts (i.e., bankruptcy court, district court, BAP, court of appeals, and federal courts from other circuits).
We do not use a zero-truncated model for these dependent variables since some of the observations do have
zero values.
156
To predict the total number of positive district court citations to first-tier appellate opinions, we
initially fitted a negative binomial regression model that included all of the independent variables included
in the negative binomial regression model used for the other types of citations (the full model). Although
the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor in the full model, the model as a whole was not
statistically significant (chi-squared = 19.21, df = 12, p = 0.0836). Accordingly, using a backward-selection
stepwise regression, we fitted a partial model that only included the Court, Debtor, Subject, and Fiscal Year
variables. This partial model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 16.70, df = 5, p = 0.0051), and the
Court variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 0.032).
157
For detailed results from these regression models, see infra Appendix tbl.8.
158
For one exception, we do not use a negative binomial regression model: In order to predict the
number of citing references that examined the first-tier appellate opinion (i.e., an opinion that contains an
extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text), we used a Poisson
regression analysis since the values for this variable were not overdispersed.
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their mean, we find that BAP opinions had a statistically significant higher number of
citing references by other federal courts that (1) provided discussion of less than a
paragraph but more than a brief reference to the cited opinion—approximately 3 more
citing references of this type—and (2) provided discussion of more than a paragraph but
less than a printed page of the opinion—approximately 0.39 more citing references of this
type of this type.159 On the other hand, we found no statistically significant relationship
between the type of first-tier appellate court that issued the opinion and the number of
citing references that either mentioned the opinion (i.e., contained a brief reference to the
cited opinion, usually in a string citation) or examined the opinion (i.e., contained an
extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text).160
Including the same observations and independent variables from the regression
models we used to predict the extent of citation and depth of treatment by citing
references, we predict through binary logistic regression the tendency of first-tier
appellate opinions to be directly quoted by federal courts that positively cite to those
opinions. We find that, all other things being equal, BAP opinions had a statistically
significant greater chance of being directly quoted than district court opinions.161 Based
on the predicted probabilities of direct quotation calculated from the actual values of the
independent variables included in the model, BAP opinions, on average, had
approximately a 65% chance of being directly quoted in contrast to 39% for district court
opinions. While only 8.5% of the BAP opinions had less than a 50% chance of being
directly quoted, four-fifths (80%) of the district court opinions had this predicted
probability. We present the distribution of predicted probabilities for direct quotation in
Figure 6 below.

159

To predict the total number of positive citations that provided discussion of more than a paragraph
but less than a printed page of the opinion, we initially fitted a negative binomial regression model that
included all of the independent variables included in the negative binomial regression model used for the
other types of citations (the full model). Although the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor
in the full model, the model as a whole was not statistically significant (chi-squared = 15.41, df = 12, p =
0.2200). Accordingly, using a backward-selection stepwise regression, we fitted a partial model that only
included the Court and Subject variables. This partial model was statistically significant (chi-squared =
9.67, df = 2, p = 0.0080), and the Court variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p =
0.008).
160
For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9.
161
None of the other independent variables was a statistically significant predictor of direct quotation
of the first-tier appellate opinion by its citing reference. For detailed results from the regression model, see
infra Appendix tbl.11.
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FIGURE 6
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR DIRECT QUOTATION OF
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS

15
0

5

10

15
10
0

5

Percentage of Opinions

20

BAP

20

District Court

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

Predicted Probability for Direct Positive Quotation

Moreover, if we look to the extent of direct quotation of first-tier appellate
opinions, a negative binomial regression model indicates that a statistically significant
relationship existed between the type of first-tier appellate court to have issued the
opinion and the extent to which other federal courts directly quoted the opinion.162
Specifically, we find that, holding all other variables constant at their mean, a BAP
opinion was predicted to have approximately 0.75 more citing references that directly
quoted it than did a district court opinion.163 These findings support Hypotheses 9A and
9B.
Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 10, even when controlling for other
factors. A zero-truncated negative binomial regression model indicates that the type of
first-tier appellate court to have issued the opinion influenced the immediacy with which
it was cited. With all variables held at their mean for positively cited opinions, the shift
from a district court opinion to a BAP opinion was predicted to decrease the amount of
time within which the opinion was first cited by approximately 224 days. It would seem,
162

The model incorporates the same independent variables and observations from the binary logistic
regression model used to predict the tendency for direct quotation of first-tier appellate opinions.
163
No statistically significant relationship existed between any of the other independent variables and
the number of citations that directly quoted the first-tier appellate opinion. For detailed results from the
regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9.
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therefore, that BAP opinions commanded the attention of other federal courts more
quickly than did district court opinions.164
D.

Interpretation of Results

Our inquiry into the perceived quality of appellate review has focused on two
types of perception: (1) the manner in which courts of appeals, upon direct review, have
perceived BAPs and district courts to perform their error-finding function; and (2) the
manner in which other federal courts have signaled, through citation practices, their
perception of the quality of appellate review provided by BAPs and district courts. We
conducted our inquiry by testing a series of hypotheses predicting that BAPs, by virtue of
their structural features, would be perceived to provide a quality of appellate review
superior to that of their district court counterparts. In the end, our statistical analyses
generated considerable evidence in support of our hypotheses. We repeatedly found a
statistically significant, positive association between BAPs and various measures for the
perception of the quality of appellate review. However, as statistical significance does not
necessarily translate into substantive significance, we seek to give a richer account of the
different ways in which our results buttress our claims.
First, we found for a limited subset of data that, even when controlling for other factors,
the likelihood of full affirmance by the court of appeals increased from 61% for district
courts to 83% for BAPs. Given that affirmance deference has been documented to be a
major determinant of circuit court outcomes,165 the statistically significant difference in
affirmance rates takes on added significance. While legal procedural requirements
generally require a circuit court to accord deference to a lower court’s findings of fact,
the legal standard most often applicable to a lower court’s conclusions of law—de novo
review—calls for no such deference. If circuit courts affirm BAPs at a statistically
significant greater rate than district courts, notwithstanding the affirmance bias created by
legal review standards, our results suggest that the circuit courts perceive the BAP to
perform its error-finding function better than the district court.166
Second, we generally found statistically significant evidence that, all other things
being equal, BAP opinions enjoyed higher numbers of positive citations by other federal
courts; BAP opinions were cited in greater depth; and BAP opinions were cited with
greater immediacy. We noted above that citations rates are most relevant and most
informative in the absence of a stare decisis obligation.167 Accordingly, we find that our
164

For detailed results from the regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.10.
See CROSS, supra note 92, at 39-68.
166
Although we did not find a similar statistically significant relationship for the observations in our
second-tier database, our bivariate analysis nonetheless showed a distinct difference existed in the
affirmance rates of BAP dispositions (82%) and district court dispositions (68%)—a difference that had a
9.2% probability of being the product of random chance alone. When one considers that a study conducted
by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) found that courts of appeals fully affirmed the judgments of district
courts in bankruptcy appeals approximately 73% of the time and that the study further estimated that the
affirmance rates for BAP judgments would be similar, see McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 630, we
conclude that our evidence, and in particular our statistically significant evidence, contravenes the prior
understanding of outcomes in the bankruptcy appeals system.
167
See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
165
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results regarding the citation practices of courts of appeals and federal courts in other
circuits merit particular attention.
At first blush, one might not consider our statistically significant finding that BAP
opinions were predicted to receive approximately 0.2 more citations by courts of appeals
to be substantively significant. Placed in its proper context, however, this finding takes on
new light. As an initial matter, courts of appeals were incredibly parsimonious in their
citing of first-tier appellate opinions. Specifically, 82% of the first-tier appellate opinions
did not receive any circuit court citations, thus making any amount of citation by the
courts of appeals impressive. Furthermore, we estimate pursuant to our regression
analysis that the rate of citation over a five-year period to BAP opinions by courts of
appeals was 2.33 times greater than that for district court opinions.168 These findings
confirm anecdotal evidence reported by the Federal Judicial Center that circuit judges
perceive BAP opinions to be of a higher quality than district court opinions.169 Thus,
although the size of the statistically significant effect we witness with respect to circuit
court citations appears small, we interpret it to have substantive significance. Finally, we
uncovered statistically significant evidence to support our hypothesis that federal courts
in other circuits would positively cite with greater frequency to BAP opinions—
specifically, a rate predicted to be 1.45 times greater than that for district court
opinions.170 In light of “the dearth of binding precedent [on questions of substantive
bankruptcy law] from the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court,”171 one might interpret
the intercircuit favoritism of BAP opinions over district court opinions as the next-best
source of authority.
When we consider these findings in concert with the rest of our findings on
citation practices, we conclude that there exists strong support for the notion that, in a
variety of ways, other judicial actors in the bankruptcy appeals process perceive BAPs to
provide a better quality of appellate review than district courts. These conclusions, then,
provide strong validation to commentators who have theorized about the ideal attributes
of appellate review. To the extent that courts in fact strive to resolve cases correctly, the
findings suggest that BAPs in fact offer higher quality appellate review than do district
courts. That conclusion, in turn, has important ramifications for policymakers. It would
seem desirable for policymakers to introduce more multimember appellate tribunals
staffed by judges with particular expertise in the subject matter of the appeals that the
tribunals will hear.172
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See infra Appendix tbl.8. We are 95% certain that this rate is in the range of 1.30 to 4.21. See id.
See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 678 (“There is anecdotal evidence that circuit judges
find the BAP decisions they review better reasoned and the cases better prepared for review than decisions
from the district courts, and that this impression is independent of the likelihood of affirmance or reversal.”
(emphasis added)).
170
See infra Appendix tbl.8. We are 95% certain that this rate is in the range of 1.03 to 2.03. See id.
171
See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 628.
172
See, e.g., id. at 634 (“[U]sers of the complex bankruptcy system probably want precedent not just
settled, but settled right . . . . If early (and in the Ninth Circuit, not so early) impressions about the quality
of work by the bankruptcy appellate panels hold up, the dual needs for binding authority and substantive
correctness . . . argue for some sort of a dual or hybrid system involving bankruptcy appellate panels in
some form.”).
169
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It is important to emphasize again that those conclusions clearly result only if
courts in fact strive to reach correct resolution of cases and issues. And that is a question
on which our data do not, and cannot shed light. It may be the case that, partly as a result
of theoreticians’ writings, courts favor BAPs over district courts not because they truly
conclude that BAPs are correct more often, but rather because they simply believe
(without truly examining) that BAPs are correct, which in turn inclines them simply to
affirm the conclusions of BAPs. If so, the lesson for policymakers is murkier.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown, as a general matter, that federal courts, in different
ways, have expressed a general preference for the quality of appellate review afforded by
BAPs as opposed to district courts. On the hardly implausible assumption that courts in
fact strive to resolve cases and issues correctly, this finding tends to validate
theoreticians’ claims about the ideal attributes of appellate review, since BAPs, more so
than district courts, tend to feature those attributes. Upon the same assumption, the
finding also should prompt policymakers to introduce more appellate tribunals with these
attributes—specifically multimember panels whose members enjoy an expertise in the
types of matters likely to fill up the docket of the tribunals.
We believe that future research in the area will offer even more insights. We
intend to continue our exploration by refining our consideration of issues that come
before courts. Perhaps, for example, some issues lend themselves more to solution by
expert panels than do others. We also hope to consider the effect of having competition
between appellate tribunals, such as exists between BAPs and district courts in the
bankruptcy appeals context.

We emphasize that our findings do not speak to whether it is more desirable to have many such
tribunals—as is the case with BAPs—or just one national tribunal—as is the case, for example, with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for patent appeals. That issue would seem to turn on
how important it is to have an intermediate appellate tribunal announce legal rules with national uniformity.
See, e.g., id. at 649 (“Structural nonuniformity may or may not detrimentally affect the functioning of the
system and the practice of bankruptcy law. Although nonuniform interpretation of the bankruptcy laws is
undesirable (at least beyond a certain healthy percolation), it is likely that intercircuit nonuniformity of
structure affects few users of the system. Intracircuit nonuniformity, on the other hand, may raise costs
somewhat for those litigants whose counsel must evaluate the likelihood of success under alternate routes
by researching different lines of (nonbinding) authority.”).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Sample of Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions
Panel A: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) Opinions by Fiscal
Year
Fiscal Year

District Court Opinions

Column Percentage

BAP Opinions

Column Percentage

1998

56

34.57

34

32.08

1999

53

32.72

44

41.51

2000

53

32.72

28

26.42

Total

162

100.00

106

100.00

Source: First-Tier Database

Panel B: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions by Circuit
Circuit

District
Court

Column
Percentage

First

Column
Percentage

BAP

Column
Percentage

Total

7

4.32

10

9.43

17

6.34

Second

32

19.75

5

4.72

37

13.81

Third

26

16.05

0

0.00

26

9.70

Fourth

9

5.56

0

0.00

9

3.36

Fifth

14

8.64

0

0.00

14

5.22

Sixth

16

9.88

11

10.38

27

10.07

Seventh

23

14.20

0

0.00

23

8.58

Eighth

2

1.23

22

20.75

24

8.96

Ninth

14

8.64

31

29.25

45

16.79

Tenth

7

4.32

27

25.47

34

12.69

Eleventh

12

7.41

0

0.00

12

4.48

District of
Columbia

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

162

100.0

106

100.00

268

100.00

Total

Source: First-Tier Database
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Panel C: Court of Appeals Opinions by Fiscal Year and First-Tier Court Reviewed
Fiscal Year

Reviewing District Court

Column Percentage

Reviewing BAP

Column Percentage

1998

42

30.66

13

39.39

1999

44

32.12

9

27.27

2000

51

37.23

11

33.33

Total

137

100.00

33

100.00

Source: Second-Tier Database

Panel D: Court of Appeals Opinions by Circuit and First-Tier Appellate Court
Reviewed
Circuit
First

District
Court

Column
Percentage

Column
Percentage

BAP

Column
Percentage

Total

3

2.19

3

9.09

6

3.53

14

10.22

2

6.06

16

9.41

Third

7

5.11

0

0.00

7

4.12

Fourth

8

5.84

0

0.00

8

4.71

Fifth

23

16.79

0

0.00

23

13.53

Sixth

15

10.95

2

6.06

17

10.00

Seventh

16

11.68

0

0.00

16

9.41

Eighth

10

7.30

2

6.06

12

7.06

Ninth

26

18.98

23

69.70

49

28.82

Tenth

8

5.84

1

3.03

9

5.29

Eleventh

6

4.38

0

0.00

6

3.53

District of
Columbia

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

137

100.00

33

100.00

170

100.00

Second

Total

Source: Second-Tier Database
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Table 2: Frequency of Dispositions Rendered on Appeal
Panel A: First-Tier Dispositions
Disposition

Frequency

Percentage

Negative

78

29.10

Hybrid

22

8.21

Positive

168

62.69

Total

268

100.00

Source: First-Tier Database

Panel B: Second-Tier Dispositions
Disposition

Frequency

Percentage

Negative

33

19.41

Hybrid

17

10.00

Positive

120

70.59

Total

170

100.00

Source: Second-Tier Database

Table 3: Data for First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions with Positive Citing
References
Panel A: Frequency of Positive Citation to First-Tier Appellate Opinions
Number of
Citations

Frequency

Percentage

1

45

22.28

2

35

17.33

3

24

11.88

4

17

8.42

5

18

8.91

≥6

63

31.18

Total

202

100.00

Source: First-Tier Database

52

Panel B: Distribution of Positive Citations to First-Tier Appellate Opinions
N

25%

Median

75%

Mean

202

1

2

5

4

Source: First-Tier Database

Table 4: Court of Appeals Disposition by First-Tier Appellate Court
Panel A: Second-Tier Database
Court of Appeals Disposition
First-Tier Court

Negative

Hybrid

Positive

Total

2
(6.06)

4
(12.12)

27
(81.82)

33
(100.00)

District Court

31
(22.63)

13
(9.49)

93
(67.88)

137
(100.00)

Total

33
(19.41)

17
(10.00)

120
(70.59)

170
(100.00)

BAP

Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided Fisher test is 0.092.

Panel B: First-Tier Database
Court of Appeals Disposition
First-Tier Court

Negative

Hybrid

Positive

Total

BAP

3
(11.11)

2
(7.41)

22
(81.48)

27
(100.00)

District Court

18
(36.00)

1
(2.00)

31
(62.00)

50
(100.00)

Total

21
(27.27)

3
(3.90)

53
(68.83)

77
(100.00)

Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided Fisher test is 0.029.
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Table 5: Citing Reference Data
Panel A: Federal Court Positive Citing Reference by Type of First-Tier Appellate
Opinion
Positive Citing Reference by Federal Court
No

First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

Yes

Total

10
(9.43)

96
(90.57)

106
(100.00)

District Court

56
(34.57)

106
(65.43)

162
(100.00)

Total

66
(24.63)

202
(75.37)

268
(100.00)

BAP

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test with one degree of
freedom is less than 0.0001.

Panel B: Citing Reference Data by Type of Citing Court for Positively Cited FirstTier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions
Citing References
Citing Court: All Federal Courts

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

6.00

7.27

94

District Court Opinions

2.00

3.25

106

Citing Court: Court of Appeals

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.45

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.19

106

Citing Court: Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.00

2.01

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.15

106

t-test of difference in means: t = 6.5107 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 6.257 (p < 0.0001)***

t-test of difference in means: t = 2.7414 (p = 0.0067)**
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.560 (p = 0.0105)*

t-test of difference in means: t = 9.7270 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 9.368 (p < 0.0001)***
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Citing Court: District Court

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.57

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

0.99

106

Citing Court: Bankruptcy Court

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

3.00

4.23

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

1.92

106

t-test of difference in means: t = -2.0821 (p = 0.0386)*
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -3.194 (p = 0.0014)**

t-test of difference in means: t = 5.2142 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 4.593 (p < 0.0001)***

Citing Court: Federal Courts from Other Circuits

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.50

2.52

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

1.50

106

t-test of difference in means: t = 3.0581 (p = 0.0025)**
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 3.337 (p = 0.0008)***

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Panel C: Citing Reference Data by Depth of Treatment for Positively Cited FirstTier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions
Citing References
Depth of Treatment: Mentioned

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.00

1.09

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.73

106

Depth of Treatment: Cited

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

4.50

5.22

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

1.94

106

Depth of Treatment: Discussed

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.89

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.48

106

Depth of Treatment: Examined

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.05

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.09

106

t-test of difference in means: t = 1.8837 (p = 0.0611)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.288 (p = 0.0221)*

t-test of difference in means: t = 7.3435 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 6.941 (p < 0.0001)***

t-test of difference in means: t = 2.8311 (p = 0.0051)**
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.349 (p = 0.0188)*

t-test of difference in means: t = -1.0285 (p = 0.3050)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.889 (p = 0.3741)
Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Panel D: Federal Court Positive Quoting References by Type of First-Tier Appellate
Opinion
Positive Quoting Reference by Federal Court
No

First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

Yes

Total

BAP

33
(35.11)

61
(64.89)

94
(100.00)

District Court

65
(61.32)

41
(38.68)

106
(100.00)

Total

98
(49.00)

102
(51.00)

200
(100.00)

Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test with one degree of
freedom is less than 0.0001.

Panel E: Citing Reference Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy
Appellate Opinions
Citing References
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.00

1.43

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.58

106

t-test of difference in means: t = 4.4839 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 4.473 (p < 0.0001)***
Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.

Panel F: Immediacy Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy Appellate
Opinions
Number of Days
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

177

306

94

District Court Opinions

387

530

106

t-test of difference in means: t = -3.9754 (p = 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -4.089 (p < 0.0001)***
Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Table 6: Ordinal Logistic Regression Model of Court of Appeals Disposition of
Appeals from First-Tier Court
Variable

Odds Ratio

95% Confidence Interval

Court

5.465*

(1.266, 23.594)

Published

0.601

(0.142, 2.534)

Appellant

2.139

(0.379, 12.081)

Appellee

1.681

(0.377, 7.493)

Chapter 7

8.008**

(1.977, 32.440)

Debtor Type

2.545

(0.461, 14.055)

Dispute Type

1.074

(0.249, 4.633)

Subject

0.296

(0.071, 1.236)

FY 1998

1.050

(0.236, 4.675)

FY 1999

1.054

(0.240, 4.624)

N

77

Log likelihood

-46.943

Pseudo R²

0.174

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. We conducted a likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds
across response categories to verify that our model did not violate the proportional odds assumption. A
likelihood-ratio chi-square value of 8.24 (p = 0.6050) indicated that no violation occurred.
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Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Positive Citation by a Federal
Court to First-Tier Appellate Opinion
Variable

Odds Ratio

95% Confidence Interval

Court

3.445**

(1.515, 7.836)

Disposition—Narrowly Defined

1.459

(0.724, 2.942)

Published

6.810***

(3.391, 13.673)

Appellant

0.868

(0.361, 2.086)

Appellee

1.278

(0.524, 3.118)

Chapter 7

1.335

(0.644, 2.765)

Debtor Type

1.278

(0.644, 2.765)

Dispute Type

2.881*

(1.148, 7.231)

Subject

3.392**

(1.379, 8.346)

Subsequent Appeal

0.937

(0.450, 1.951)

FY 1998

0.745

(0.336, 1.653)

FY 1999

1.072

(0.469, 2.452)

N

268

Log likelihood

-116.625

Pseudo R²

0.220

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Table 8: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing
References to Positively-Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Type
of Federal Court)
Variable

All Federal
Court
Citationsa

Bankruptcy
Court
Citationsb

District Court
Citationsc

BAP
Citationsb

Court of
Appeals
Citationsd

Intercircuit
Citationsb

Court

2.538***
(1.836, 3.509)

2.072***
(1.509, 2.845)

0.628*
(0.410, 0.962)

9.702***
(5.462, 17.231)

2.336**
(1.297, 4.206)

1.447*
(1.030, 2.031)

Disposition

0.995
(0.732, 1.352)

0.985
(0.726, 1.337)

1.088
(0.738, 1.605)

0.873
(0.517, 1.473)

1.000
(0.716, 1.397)

Published

1.838**
(1.128, 2.994)

1.563
(0.968, 2.526)

4.276
(0.985, 18.560)

3.524
(0.820, 15.141)

1.552**
(0.502)

Appellant

1.020
(0.685, 1.519)

1.023
(0.686, 1.527)

0.925
(0.573, 1.493)

1.381
(0.614, 3.104)

4.814***
(2.443, 9.488)

Appellee

1.005
(0.681, 1.519)

1.096
(0.740, 1.623)

0.470**
(0.275, 0.802)

2.306*
(1.101, 4.830)

1.055
(0.681, 1.633)

Chapter 7

1.395*
(1.011, 1.924)

1.386*
(1.010, 1.904)

1.330
(0.873, 2.026)

1.629
(0.901, 2.948)

1.112
(0.783, 1.581)

Debtor Type

1.349
(0.893, 2.040)

1.279
(0.845, 1.936)

0.678
(0.369, 1.245)

2.498*
(1.174, 5.312)

1.251
(0.801, 1.953)

Dispute
Type

0.817
(0.550, 1.212)

0.796
(0.538, 1.178)

1.452
(0.871, 2.418)

0.678
(0.326, 1.413)

0.930
(0.614, 1.408)

Subject

1.435
(0.971, 2.121)

1.160
(0.783, 1.720)

1.870*
(1.125, 3.107)

1.341
(0.634, 2.838)

1.202
(0.797, 1.814)

Subsequent
Appeal

1.092
(0.795, 1.501)

1.063
(0.777, 1.455)

1.169
(0.789, 1.731)

0.949
(0.536, 1.682)

1.127
(0.805, 1.579)

FY 1998

1.134
(0.778, 1.651)

0.845
(0.584, 1.223)

1.687*
(0.999, 2.847)

1.657*
(1.018, 2.687)

0.700
(0.376, 1.302)

0.194
(0.606, 1.378)

FY 1999

1.004
(0.711, 1.418)

0.926
(0.659, 1.301)

1.324
(0.789, 2.223)

1.237
(0.799, 1.915)

0.447*
(0.240, 0.832)

0.867
(0.595, 1.263)

N
Pseudo R²

1.485
(0.953, 2.316)

1.492
(0.976, 2.280)

200

200

200

200

200

200

0.063

0.050

0.034

0.242

0.124

0.053

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***p ≤ 0.001,
** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
a
Zero-truncated negative binomial regression model.
b
Negative binomial regression model.
c
We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the independent variables
in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 156.
d
Poisson regression model.
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Table 9: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing
References to Positively-Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Depth
of Treatment)
Variable

Citeda

Discussedb

Quoteda

Court

2.525***
(1.922, 3.317)

1.798**
(1.164, 2.779)

2.338***
(1.527, 3.580)

Disposition

1.023
(0.789, 1.325)

0.828
(0.561, 1.222)

Published

1.521
(0.997, 2.321)

1.535
(0.771, 3.056)

Appellant

1.127
(0.809, 1.569)

1.288
(0.761, 2.179)

Appellee

1.021
(0.735, 1.420)

1.373
(0.817, 2.307)

Chapter 7

1.352*
(1.027, 1.779)

1.302
(0.853, 1.988)

Debtor Type

1.305
(0.922, 1.847)

1.508
(0.881, 2.580)

Dispute Type

0.853
(0.608, 1.197)

0.913
(0.549, 1.517)

Subject

1.174
(0.839, 1.643)

Subsequent Appeal

0.915
(0.699, 1.197)

0.676
(0.438, 1.043)

FY 1998

1.101
(0.804, 1.506)

1.450
(0.885, 2.374)

FY 1999

0.969
(0.725, 1.296)

1.366
(0.862, 2.163)

N
Pseudo R²

1.397
(0.882, 2.213)

1.059
(0.645, 1.741)

200

200

200

0.076

0.021

0.060

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***p ≤ 0.001,
** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. We have only presented the results from those regression analyses in which the
Court variable was a statistically significant predictor.
a
Negative binomial regression model.
b
We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the independent variables
in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 159.
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Table 10: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Regression Model of Number of Days
for First Positive Federal Court Citing Reference to Positively-Cited First-Tier
Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions
Variable

Incidence Rate Ratio

95% Confidence Interval

Court

0.565***

(0.423, 0.753)

Disposition—Narrowly Defined

0.913

(0.698, 1.194)

Published

0.922

(0.631, 1.345)

Appellant

1.116

(0.781, 1.595)

Appellee

1.097

(0.761, 1.582)

Chapter 7

0.767

(0.579, 1.016)

Debtor Type

1.125

(0.784, 1.615)

Dispute Type

0.836

(0.596, 1.174)

Subject

0.670*

(0.480, 0.937)

Subsequent Appeal

0.681*

(0.507, 0.914)

FY 1998

0.860

(0.607, 1.220)

FY 1999

0.927

(0.676, 1.272)

N

200

Pseudo R²

0.013

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***p ≤ 0.001,
**
p
≤
0.01,
*
p
≤
0.05.
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Table 11: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Direct Quotation of Positively-Cited
First-Tier Appellate Opinion by Positive Citing Federal Courts
Variable

Odds Ratio

95% Confidence Interval

Court

2.727**

(1.393, 5.339)

Disposition—Narrowly Defined

0.563

(0.297, 1.067)

Published

1.142

(0.455, 2.868)

Appellant

1.079

(0.473, 2.461)

Appellee

1.173

(0.514, 2.681)

Chapter 7

1.083

(0.555, 2.112)

Debtor Type

0.769

(0.339, 1.748)

Dispute Type

0.861

(0.381, 1.946)

Subject

1.050

(0.474, 2.328)

Subsequent Appeal

0.702

(0.360, 1.370)

FY 1998

1.079

(0.501, 2.323)

FY 1999

2.007

(0.964, 4.178)

N

200

Log likelihood

-126.033

Pseudo R²

0.091

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Jonathan R. Nash
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jnash@uchicago.edu
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